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Wisdom is considered the apex of human development, exemplified in various cultural traditions 
by optimal, balanced judgment and decision making that benefits others and the self. 
Contemporary psychological accounts suggest that practicing wisdom through reasoning (i.e., 
intellectual humility, recognition of uncertainty and change, consideration of the broader context 
at hand and perspectives of others, integration of these perspectives/compromise) can help 
people to adaptively navigate everyday social challenges, yet large-scale empirical investigation 
on this topic is lacking. In this dissertation, I introduce and validate a new method to assess 
situation-specific wise reasoning. To encourage future research on the topic, I establish an initial 
nomological network of individual differences around wise reasoning and show its relations to 
fundamental constructs, including increased cooperation and reduced bias. I also show that 
experimentally enhancing wise reasoning can result in more cooperative, balanced attitudes and 
emotions (e.g., reduced attitude polarization; greater tolerance for outgroups). The findings 
presented in this dissertation suggest that wise reasoning can help people to navigate everyday 
social challenges. Implications for theory, future research, and practical applications for wise 
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People from virtually every culture consider wisdom the apex of human development. 
Wisdom is generally thought of as acquisition of knowledge, discernment, insight, and just 
judgment into the qualities and relationships in life’s challenges (e.g., Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary). Often associated with historical sages and leaders (e.g., King Solomon; The 
Buddha; Rāhula, 1974; Weststrate, Ferrari, & Ardelt, 2016), wisdom manifests itself as balance 
in thinking and emotion, unbiased judgment, and motivation toward others’ well-being (Baltes & 
Smith, 2008a; Birren & Svensson, 2005; McKee & Barber, 1999; Staudinger & Glück, 2011). 
Here, I provide a new approach to the empirical research on wisdom by considering 
cognitive (i.e., reasoning) processes that can promote wise decision making (phronesis; Aristotle, 
2011). I suggest that these cognitive processes (henceforth, wise reasoning) relate to beneficial 
outcomes that are core to wisdom, for example, more moderate emotional reactions and greater 
tolerance in social challenges, and motivation that balances self-interest with concern for others 
(Staudinger & Glück, 2011). Large-scale empirical exploration on this topic is now imperative. 
Many contemporary scholars and practitioners have called for wisdom in many challenging 
social domains, including education, conflict resolution, leadership, and business (Baltes & 
Smith, 2008b; Goold & Campbell, 1998; Haque, 2010; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 2011; Rooney & 
McKenna, 2008; Staudinger & Glück, 2011; Sternberg, 2010). Despite broad interest in wisdom, 
the topic has not enjoyed large-scale empirical study, and there are glaring gaps in the research 
on wisdom in the literature on organizational behavior and leadership, my primary interests. I 
suggest that this is because extant methods to assess wisdom either prevent or discourage such 
study. Namely, the existing self-report methods, though efficient, suffer from validity issues. 





processes that could promote wisdom. Other-rated performance methods to assess wisdom, 
though more valid and context-specific, require daunting administrative costs and procedures 
that discourage large-scale research.  
A new measure that invites large-scale study is therefore required. The new measure 
should focus on reasoning processes that can provide the foundation for wisdom, to allow 
researchers to explore in detail how wisdom can be practiced and developed in different 
domains. It must be adaptable to different life challenges and should be designed with such 
adaptability in mind, to enable exploration into a broad range of contemporary challenges (e.g., 
conflict resolution, leadership) in which practical application of wisdom is desired. As a matter 
of course, it needs to be shown that people engage in wise reasoning within or about such 
challenges, and that doing so relates to adaptive psychosocial outcomes. In this dissertation, I 
show such evidence.  
Accordingly, the starting point in my dissertation research will be to describe the design 
of a new measure of wise reasoning that is both valid and allows for efficient, large-scale 
exploration. The new measure uses the event-reconstruction method (Kahneman, Krueger, 
Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2004; Schwarz, Kahneman, & Xu, 2009) to minimize biased 
responding and improve accuracy of assessment. The event-reconstruction also allows for 
context-specific assessment of wise reasoning, an important factor in making the measure 
adaptable to different life challenges. I describe the design of the new measure, examine the 
extent to which people use wise reasoning in their own life challenges, and test whether wise 
reasoning represents a reliably testable, unitary construct. I test the construct validity of wise 
reasoning. I establish an initial nomological network (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955) of individual 





reasoning. Next, I expand this network to show that wise reasoning relates to affective and 
motivational variables that are critical to relational and societal well-being. Specifically, I show 
that wise reasoning is associated with improved cooperation, reduced intergroup bias, and greater 
tolerance and support for outgroups. Finally, on the notion of practice and development, it is 
important to show that wise reasoning is not reserved only to certain rare individuals. Thus, I 
show that wise reasoning can be experimentally enhanced via simple instructions, with results 
that mirror those of naturalistic or individual differences in wise reasoning. Facilitating wise 
reasoning effectively reduced intergroup bias, and led to greater tolerance and more cooperative 
motivations toward outgroups. Below, I provide a brief discussion on wise reasoning. I then 
describe my dissertation research. I conclude by discussing future directions for research and 
practice in wise reasoning. 
Introduction to Wise Reasoning 
Wisdom concerns the ability to master life’s challenges, primarily ill-defined social 
dilemmas without easily-discernable optimal solutions. According to contemporary perspectives, 
mastering life’s challenges includes reasoning broadly and deeply on self, others, and the world, 
effective emotion regulation and tolerance for ambiguity and different values, and motivation 
that transcends immediate self-interest (Ardelt & Ferrari, 2014; Staudinger & Glück, 2011). My 
research is focused on reasoning processes that can promote wisdom when navigating life’s 
challenges. 
What kinds of reasoning processes promote wisdom? Philosophers and psychological 
scientists view possession of general knowledge or cognitive ability as insufficient for wisdom 
(Ardelt, 2004; Baltes & Kunzmann, 2004; Baltes & Smith, 2008; Baltes & Staudinger, 2000; 





2013). Rather, or in addition, context-sensitive reasoning is particularly important for flexibly 
navigating life’s uncertainties (Baltes & Kunzmann, 2004; Baltes & Smith, 2008b; Baltes & 
Staudinger, 2000; Berry & Irvine, 1986; Grossmann, Na, Varnum, Kitayama, & Nisbett, 2013; 
Grossmann, 2017). Such uncertainties often originate from intrapersonal, interpersonal, and/or 
extra-personal (i.e., intergroup) conflicts experienced in everyday life (Sternberg, 1998). 
Reasoning wisely is proposed to strike a balance between these conflicting interests (Rāhula, 
1974; Staudinger & Glück, 2011; Sternberg, 1998).  
Beginning to address wise reasoning processes, Clayton (1975, 1982) defined wisdom as 
acknowledging and accommodating the paradoxes and contradictions that mark social 
challenges, guided by the principle of dialecticism. Part of the foundation of wise reasoning, 
dialectical thinking involves juxtaposing opposed ideas, such as varying perspectives, in the 
service of resolving apparent conflicts or revealing underlying truths. Invoking dialecticism 
allowed Clayton to distinguish between wisdom and domain-general cognitive abilities that 
characterize rational/analytical thought (e.g., intelligence). Specifically, domain-general abilities 
draw on symbolic rules and procedures such as propositional logic (Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992) 
that are (better) suited for solving well-defined problems. In contrast, ill-defined problems (e.g., 
those involving values trade-offs, or those with missing information about initial or end/goal 
states, or means to a solution; Jonassen, 1997; Simon, 1973) are more complex and dynamic, and 
therefore less amenable to resolution via processes like logic (e.g., Haugeland, 1989). Rather, ill-
defined problems require more open, tolerant, flexible reasoning about relevant (i.e., context-
specific) information (Clayton, 1982; Hieronymi, 2013; Sinnott, 1984, 1989). Importantly, the 
problems encountered in social challenges are ill-defined (Allaire & Marsiske, 2002; Frensch & 





above general cognitive abilities. Indeed, theoretical and empirical work has suggested that 
general cognitive ability is not sufficient for dealing with ill-defined problems, and that this may 
be because intelligence is not sufficient for overcoming egocentric biases in thinking and 
reasoning (Stanovich & West, 2008; West, Meserve, & Stanovich, 2012). Thus, although higher 
cognitive abilities are necessary, they are not sufficient for wisdom (Grossmann et al., 2013; 
Grossmann, Sahdra, & Ciarrochi, 2016; Staudinger, Lopez, & Baltes, 1997; Sternberg, 1998).  
Another common conceptual feature uniting wise reasoning is transcendence (i.e., 
surpassing; going beyond) from immediate egocentrism (i.e., myopic focus on one’s own 
immediate opinions, perspectives, outcomes, concerns, or desires on an issue). Transcendent 
reasoning includes taking a broad and multifaceted purview of situations, and acknowledgement 
and tolerance for contrasting views. Such reasoning bolsters dialectical thinking with prosociality 
by attenuating egocentrism and amplifying the relevance of others’ viewpoints and needs. As 
such, transcendent thinking and reasoning has often been argued by notable wisdom scholars, 
and different cultural knowledge traditions in general, to boost wisdom and promote emotional 
and motivational balance (Berry & Irvine, 1986; Frankl, 1966; Grossmann & Kross, 2014; Kross 
& Grossmann, 2012; Le & Levenson, 2005; Levenson, Jennings, Aldwin, & Shiraishi, 2005; 
Rāhula, 1974; Vervaeke & Ferraro, 2013). 
Uniting the concepts of dialectical thinking and transcendence, contemporary wisdom 
theorists cite an amalgum of wise reasoning processes: i) recognition of the limits of one’s own 
knowledge, ii) recognition of uncertainty and change, iii) consideration of multiple ways a 
situation could unfold, iv) recognition of others’ perspectives, v) consideration of/search for 
compromise, vi) recognition of the importance of conflict resolution, and vii) application of an 





Clayton, 1975; Grossmann et al., 2010; Grossmann, 2017; Helson & Wink, 1987; Kitchner, 
1983; Kramer, 2002; Meeks & Jeste, 2009; Ryff & Heincke, 1983; Ryff & Keyes, 1995; 
Vervaeke & Ferraro, 2013; Wink & Helson, 1997). Consistent with the theoretical connection 
between these forms of reasoning and the concept of wisdom, empirical studies have shown 
evidence from the contents of people’s narratives about social challenges that individuals 
nominated as wise tend to exhibit greater wise reasoning than others (e.g., Baltes, Staudinger, 
Maercker, & Smith, 1995). Further, different aspects of wise reasoning tend to converge under a 
common ‘wisdom’ construct (e.g., Grossmann et al., 2010, 2013), and the use of individual 
aspects of wise reasoning can increase the use of the others (Grossmann & Kross, 2014; Kross & 
Grossmann, 2012).  
General Overview 
Several points are worth noting in summary. First, wisdom appears to center on how one 
thinks, specifically about difficult and ill-defined social challenges (e.g., Staudinger & Glück, 
2011). Therefore, wise reasoning should be assessed within or about such challenges. Second, 
wisdom scholarship suggests that wisdom has its foundations in an amalgam of thinking 
processes. Thus, different aspects of wise reasoning ought to converge under a unitary construct. 
Third, the core benefits of wise reasoning include psychological processes or states that relate to 
well-being, for example, more moderate emotional reactions in life challenges, greater tolerance, 
and motivation that balances self-interest with care for others. I designed a new measure of wise 
reasoning with these points in mind, and tested the relations between wise reasoning and 
theorized benefits of wisdom, in order to provide a launching point for empirical investigation on 





Chapter 1 details the design of the new wise reasoning measure and presents evidence for 
its reliability and factor structure. Chapter 2 shows evidence for the convergent and discriminant 
validity of wise reasoning. Chapter 3 focuses on wise reasoning and individual-level outcomes, 
showing that it relates to constructs that relate to improved psychological well-being. Chapter 4 
focuses on wise reasoning and interpersonal-level outcomes, showing that it relates to 
cooperation—balancing self-interest with concern for others. Chapter 5 focuses on wise 
reasoning and group-level outcomes, showing that it relates to reduced intergroup bias, greater 
tolerance and support for others, and motivation to associate with outgroup members. Chapter 5 
also demonstrates that wise reasoning can be experimentally facilitated, suggesting that it can be 
practiced and developed. The data used in this dissertation has been reported in Brienza, Kung, 
Santos, Bobocel, & Grossmann (under review; Chapters 1-3), Grossmann, Brienza, & Bobocel 







CHAPTER 1: A NEW METHOD TO ASSESS WISE REASONING 
Chapter 1 summarizes the development of the situation-specific method to assess wise 
reasoning. As noted briefly above, extant measures of wisdom tend to suffer from a number of 
issues that I aimed to avoid in developing the new measure of wise reasoning. At one end of the 
spectrum, current self-report wisdom scales are efficient. However, they suffer from serious 
validity issues, namely socially desirable responding (Taylor et al., 2011), because they attempt 
to assess the highly desirable quality (Glück, König, NaschenIng, Redzanowski, Dorner, Straßer, 
et al., 2013) at an abstract level, as a personality trait. Although wisdom may include trait-like 
characteristics, the abstract focus in measurement also presents a conceptual issue in that it 
glosses over how people navigate through challenging situations, which is one of the primary 
functions of wisdom, instead assessing what people think about themselves. This trait-style 
approach to assessing wisdom therefore lacks context-sensitivity and does not permit researchers 
to explore the reasoning processes that promote wisdom.  
At the other end of the spectrum are observer-rated performance measures of wisdom. 
These measures are more valid than trait-style measures because they are context-sensitive, and 
because they avoid socially desirable responding, being scored by independent raters. However, 
observer-rated performance measures require substantial time and labor investments to 
administer (e.g., Grossmann et al., 2010; Staudinger et al., 1997; Staudinger, Smith, & Baltes, 
1994), and are therefore not efficient for large-scale investigation on wisdom.  
I aimed to overcome the above limitations. I avoided the psychometric features that tend 
to invalidate self-report measures (i.e., focusing on decontextualized abstract views about 
desirable qualities) while maintaining their efficiency (i.e., using easy to understand self-reports). 





wise performance assessments impractical, while maintaining their source of context-sensitive 
validity. Further, to minimize biased responding and to improve the accuracy of the wise 
reasoning assessment, I adopted the event-reconstruction method (Kahneman et al., 2004; 
Schwarz et al., 2009) which facilitates participants’ objective recall of a specific situation, 
including their thinking and reasoning at the time. 
First, I designed a set of 46 items (Appendix A), each meant to assess an aspect of wise 
reasoning. I then conducted principal components analyses and principal axis factoring to trim 
the number of scale items. Last, I tested whether each aspect of wise reasoning would covary 
reliably under a latent wise reasoning construct, using confirmatory factor analyses. I expected 
that the reduced set of items would exhibit good reliability and that the individual aspects of wise 
reasoning would covary reliably under a single latent wise reasoning construct. 
Study 1 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
Item reduction and initial confirmatory factor analysis. Sample A was used for initial 
item tests and initial confirmatory factor analysis (sample characteristics are presented in full, in 
Table 1). Participants were recruited from Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to take part 
in an online survey, and were compensated US$.50 for their time. I recruited participants who 
were native English speakers to avoid issues with comprehension of items for my initial item 
tests. Because conflicts are common in the workplace, in Sample A, I assessed participants’ wise 
reasoning about a conflict they experienced at their job, and requested participants who were 
currently employed full-time. Participants were employed in a broad range of occupations (e.g., 





described below and in Appendix B. They then responded to a number of other measures, 
detailed in following Chapters.  
Large-scale confirmatory factor analyses. For these tests, I included only responses 
focused on a similar context (i.e., conflicts with a close friend; Samples A and B excluded) and 
that were collected in a similar survey format (i.e., wise reasoning instrument presented first; 
Samples G-K excluded). Thus, samples C-F were used for large-scale confirmatory factor 
analyses. Participants (n = 1,708) were recruited from MTurk and compensated US$ .50 for their 
time. In these samples, I assessed participants’ wise reasoning about a conflict they experienced 
with a close friend (Appendix B). Participants first completed the wise reasoning assessment, 
and then responded to a number of other measures, detailed in following studies. 
Wise Reasoning Assessment 
Event reconstruction. Participants reconstructed a specific and recent real life 
experience before responding to the scale items. My instructions used event-reconstruction 
methods to facilitate accurate recall (Kahneman et al., 2004; Schwarz et al., 2009). First, 
participants recalled a difficult situation—an acute conflict situation or disagreement, rather than 
a recurring problem—that happened with a workmate or with a close friend, depending on the 
sample (see Table1) in the past few months. Participants reflected on what they thought and felt 
during their conflict experience. To increase accuracy of recall, participants were guided with 
questions that helped them to reconstruct the context of their experience, such as who the conflict 
was with, where they were at the time, and day of the week (see Appendix B for the full 
measure).  
Scale items. After the event reconstruction task (and after being reminded of anonymity 





MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012), participants responded to the statement, “While this situation 
was unfolding, I did the following …” by rating 46 (9 reverse-worded) wise reasoning items on a 
5-point scale (1 = Not at all, 3 = Somewhat, 5 = Very much). Items focused on one of the 
following aspects of wise reasoning: recognition of the limits of one’s own knowledge (e.g., 
“Looked for any extraordinary circumstances before forming my opinion”; 10 items), ii) 
recognition of uncertainty and change (e.g., “Looked for different solutions as the situation 
evolved”; 8 items), iii) consideration of multiple ways a situation could unfold (e.g., “Believed 
the situation could lead to a number of different outcomes”; 6 items), iv) recognition of others’ 
perspectives (e.g., “Made an effort to take the other person's perspective”; 6 items), v) 
consideration of/search for compromise (e.g., “Tried my best to find a way to accommodate both 
of us”; 6 items), vi) recognition of importance of conflict resolution (e.g., “Tried to anticipate 
how the conflict might be resolved”; 5 items), and vii) application of an outsider’s viewpoint 
(e.g., “Tried to see the conflict from the point of view of an uninvolved person”; 5 items). 
Complete list of initial items is presented in Appendix A. 
Results 
Item Reduction 
I first conducted a preliminary principal components analysis1 on all items, using 
eigenvalues > 1 and promax rotation, to determine the presence of any problematic items or 
conceptually unrelated components (e.g., results of psychometric artifacts rather than latent 
psychological factors such as wise reasoning; Jolliffe, 2002). This process revealed 8 
components, two of which clearly identified only the initial reverse-worded items, and not any 
                                                 
1 Principal components analysis was selected for this test because it makes no assumptions about 
latent psychological constructs driving responses but only reveals patterns in the response data, 





particular aspect of wise reasoning, indicating that the negative wording of these items was 
exerting undue influence on responses. Reverse-worded items were therefore removed from 
further analyses.  
Next, I conducted iterated principal axis factoring2 to reduce the scale to 2-4 items per 
aspect of wise reasoning, each of which best represented just one aspect of wise reasoning 
(Child, 2006; Floyd & Widaman, 1995; Furr & Bacharach, 2014). I imposed a 7-factor solution 
to reveal items that loaded strongly onto only one aspect, and utilized oblique rotation to allow 
factors to correlate. At each iteration, I removed items that did not load strongly onto a single 
factor (i.e., coefficients < .40; e.g., Cohen, Wolf, Panter, & Insko, 2011) or that cross-loaded 
substantially on more than one factor (< .20 difference between loadings on different factors). 
This process was repeated until all remaining items loaded > .40 on a single factor (i.e., to allow 




Next, I conducted confirmatory factor analyses (CFA; Furr & Bacharach, 2014) to assess 
the fit of the 7-factor model of wise reasoning on Sample A responses. I assessed model fit with 
standard criteria: standardized root-mean-square residual (RMSR; < .10), root-mean-square error 
of approximation (RMSEA; < .08), comparative fit index (CFI; > .95), and probability of close 
fit (PCLOSE; > .05) (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Meyers, Gamst, & Guarino, 2006). According to these 
guidelines, CFA on the initial 7-factor model showed that it could be improved (i.e., PCLOSE < 
.01). I removed one item that had clustered in an unplanned factor (item 14) and five items that 
                                                 
2 Principal axis factoring was selected for this test because it does make assumptions about latent 





exhibited highest frequency of standardized residual covariance > .40 with other items (items 4, 
6, 8, 24, and 42; Gaskin & Happell, 2014; Hoelter, 1983). After removing these 6 items, CFA on 
the resulting 21-item model indicated good fit, RMSR = .046, RMSEA = .036, CFI = .983, 
PCLOSE = .997. 
Next, I conducted a large-scale CFA on responses from Samples C-F. These were 
independent from the responses used for item-reduction and selection, and all focused on 
conflicts with a close friend. I tested the 7-factor model, which exhibited good fit, RMSR = .061, 
RMSEA = .048, CFI = .966, and PCLOSE = .876. However, I questioned whether a more 
parsimonious model (i.e., fewer latent factors) would also exhibit good model fit. Further, there 
is considerable conceptual overlap between some wise reasoning aspects, for example, i) 
multiple outcomes and change, and ii) compromise and resolution, potentially justifying their 
combination. Thus, I combined multiple outcomes with change, and compromise with resolution, 
to form two equally-weighted aspects of wise reasoning. This new 5-factor model exhibited 
slightly better fit, RMSR = .057, RMSEA = .046, CFI = .969, and PCLOSE = .990, than the 7-
factor model. Thus, on the basis of parsimony and near equivalence in item-weighting per aspect 
of wise reasoning, the 5-factor model was accepted as the final model (Figure 1). Reliability of 
the measure was consistently high: Cronbach’s α in every sample and every version of the 
measure always met or surpassed the .90 mark. Notably, despite claims that wisdom-related 
characteristics may be rare (Baltes & Smith, 2008), I observed a normal distribution (M = 3.08, 
SD = .74) with no skewness (Skew = -.21) of wise reasoning scores. 
Chapter 1 Summary 
Chapter 1 presented evidence that the new, situation-specific wise reasoning measure is 





found that the individual aspects of wise reasoning covaried reliably under a unitary wise 









CHAPTER 2: INITIAL VALIDITY TESTS 
In Chapter 2, I present initial validity tests. Specifically, I examine the convergent and 
discriminant validity of wise reasoning. Examining convergent validity, I compared wise 
reasoning to scores on three extant self-report, trait-style measures of wisdom: Self-Assessed 
Wisdom Scale (Webster, 2003), Three-Dimensional Wisdom Scale (Ardelt, 2003), Adult Self-
Transcendence Inventory (Levenson et al., 2005). I then examined whether people show 
correspondence between the extent to which they use wise reasoning about their own challenges 
versus larger-scale societal conflict. For this test, I adapted the wise reasoning measure to focus 
on reasoning about a societal conflict that was heightened at the time,3 comparing these scores to 
those from the original (interpersonal) wise reasoning measure. I also tested whether wise 
reasoning about the societal conflict corresponds with participants’ open-text wisdom 
performance scores, as rated by outside observers (Grossmann et al., 2010, 2013). To examine 
this question, I asked participants to respond via open-text to several questions about the societal 
conflict. Across all of these tests, I expected that wise reasoning would show good convergent 
validity by exhibiting positive, small-to-medium relations with the extant trait-style wisdom 
measures, the adapted intergroup wise reasoning measure, and observer-rated wisdom 
performance. 
Next, I examined the discriminant validity of wise reasoning. Biased responding (e.g., 
self-deception and impression management), is particularly problematic for self-report wisdom 
measures, ostensibly because wisdom is a highly desirable trait and because the measures 
attempt to assess wisdom as a global character trait (Assmann, 1994; Glück et al., 2013; Taylor 
                                                 
3 The intergroup conflict focused on the protests and revolution in Ukraine and the Crimea 





et al., 2011). Therefore, an important goal in creating a new paradigm to measure wisdom-related 
thinking was that it be independent from biased responding, one of the reasons why I focused the 
measure on specific situations and utilized the event-reconstruction method. Thus, in Study 2, I 
compared wise reasoning versus extant self-report trait-level wisdom scores to scores on self-
deception and impression management (Paulhus, 1984, 1988). I also compared wise reasoning 
and extant trait-style wisdom scores to social-cognitive bias, namely bias blind spot (i.e., the 
tendency to attribute greater psychological bias to others than to the self; Pronin, 2008) and 
attributional bias (i.e., attributing people's behavior solely to personality or situational factors; 
Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Grossmann & Varnum, 2011; Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, Takemura, & 
Ramaswamy, 2006; Ross, 1977), both forms of cognitive imbalance. For both biased responding 
and social-cognitive biases, I expected that wise reasoning would surpass extant trait-style 
wisdom measures by showing null or negative relations to bias.  
Study 2 
Method 
Participants and Procedures 
Participants were drawn from Samples D and E. In both samples, participants were 
recruited from MTurk to take part in an online survey, and were compensated US$.50 for their 
time. Sample D participants completed the wise reasoning measure, self-rated trait-style wisdom 
measures, indices of biased responding and social-cognitive bias. Sample E participants 
completed the wise reasoning measure and the adapted measure of wise reasoning about 








Self-Assessed Wisdom Scale (SAWS). The SAWS (Webster, 2003) is a 40-item 
measure assessing multiple wisdom dimensions: Experience (e.g., “I have overcome many 
painful events in my life”), Emotional Regulation (e.g., “I am “tuned” in to my own emotions”), 
Reminiscence/Reflection (e.g., Recalling my earlier days helps me gain insight into important 
life matters”), Humor (e.g., “Now I find that I can really appreciate life’s little ironies”), and 
Openness (e.g., “I like being around persons whose views are strongly different from mine”). 
Statements are assessed on 6-point scales (1 = Strongly disagree to 6 = Strongly agree). Per the 
author’s instructions, scores are determined by computing the mean of all items to form a total 
wisdom score; Cronbach’s α = .91.  
Three-Dimensional Wisdom Scale (3D-WS). The 3D-WS (Ardelt, 2003) is a 39-item 
measure that assesses wisdom as a composite of cognitive (e.g., “I always try to look at all sides 
of a problem”), reflective (e.g., “When I look back on what's happened to me, I feel cheated”), 
and affective dimensions (e.g., “I either get very angry or depressed if things go wrong”). 
Statements are assessed on 5-point scales (1 = Strongly agree to 5 = Strongly disagree or 1 = 
Definitely true of myself to 5 = Not true of myself). Scores are determined by computing the mean 
of each of the three dimensions and taking the mean of these three dimensional scores; α = .87.  
Adult Self-Transcendence Inventory (ASTI). The ASTI (Levenson et al., 2005) 
assesses wisdom as the development of self-transcendence, using 10 items. This scale asks 
participants to rate themselves as they are now, compared to five years ago (e.g., “I am more 
likely to engage in quiet contemplation”). Statements are assessed on 4-point scales (1 = 
Disagree strongly to 4 = Agree strongly). Scores are determined by computing the mean of all 





Observer-rated wisdom performance. Participants provided written reflections on a 
recent societal conflict, which were rated by independent observers (as in Grossmann et al., 
2010). Participants were surveyed following the Crimea referendum in Eastern Europe (March 
20th - 24th, 2014), and read a brief summary of the ongoing socio-political conflict in the Ukraine 
(Appendix C). After reading the summary, participants were asked to provide their thoughts 
about the conflict, guided by three questions, in the following order: “How do you think the 
situation in Ukraine might unfold?”, “Why do you think the issue in Ukraine might unfold in the 
way you just wrote?”, and “What do you think should be done in the situation in Ukraine?” 
(Grossmann et al., 2010, 2013).  
Following established procedures, two trained, hypothesis-blind raters content-analyzed 
participants’ narrative reflections on 5 aspects of wisdom-related thought: recognition of the 
limits of one’s own knowledge, recognition of uncertainty and change, recognition of others’ 
perspectives, consideration of/search for compromise, and importance of conflict resolution 
(Grossmann et al., 2010, 2013; Grossmann & Kross, 2014; Kross & Grossmann, 2012). Given 
that the participants were not involved in the conflict (i.e., default 3rd person perspective), I did 
not code responses for the application of an outsider’s viewpoint. Raters used a scale from 0 (Not 
at all) to 2 (A great deal). Inter-rater reliabilities for each aspect were in the medium-high range 
(.71 ≤  Cohen’s κs ≤ .79). As in  prior research (Grossmann et al., 2010, 2016; Kross & 
Grossmann, 2012), the aspects of wisdom-related thought were subjected to a principal 
components analysis, which yielded a single component solution, with the resulting factor score 
used as a metric of observer-rated wise reasoning performance scores. 
Wise reasoning about an intergroup conflict. Upon reading the summary of the 





adapted set of 21 wise reasoning items (Appendix D). In this measure, I asked participants to 
indicate the extent to which they engaged in wise reasoning as they were contemplating the 
Ukraine conflict and while completing their open-text responses on a 5-point scale (1 = Not at 
all, 3 = Somewhat, 5 = Very much); α > .93.   
Biased responding. The 20-item Self-Deception and 20-item Impression Management 
subscales of the BIDR (Paulhus, 1984, 1988) was used. Self-deception assesses overconfidence 
in oneself (e.g., “I never regret my decisions”), and impression management assesses the 
tendency to over-report desirable and under-report undesirable behavior (e.g., “I never cover up 
my mistakes”). Statements were assessed on 7-point scales (1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = 
Strongly agree). A score of 1 is assigned for each item for which the participant scores an 
extreme score (i.e., 6 or 7), and a score of 0 for each item that is scored otherwise. Following 
Paulhus (1984, 1988), item scores for each sub-scale were summed, resulting in a total range 
from 0 (low desirable responding) to 20 (high desirable responding); αs > .70.  
Bias blind spot. The paradigm developed by Pronin et al. (2002) was used. Participants 
read a description of the “self-serving bias” and were asked about their own susceptibility to this 
bias (i.e., “To what extent do you believe that you show this effect or tendency?”) and about the 
susceptibility of the average American to this bias (i.e., “To what extent do you believe the 
average American shows this effect or tendency?”), on 9-point scales (1 = Not at all to 9 = 
Strongly). Presentation order was counterbalanced. Scores were computed by calculating a 
difference score between participants’ ratings of others’ vs. their own susceptibility to the self-
serving bias. Higher scores represent greater bias blind spot.  
Biased (vs. balanced) attributions. Participants read four vignettes which depict an 





context (see Appendix E; Grossmann & Varnum, 2011; Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, Takemura, & 
Ramaswamy, 2006). After reading each vignette, participants answered two questions indicating 
1) the extent to which features of the individual, such as his/her character, attitude, or 
temperament, influenced their actions (dispositional attribution), and 2) the extent to which 
features of the environment that surround the individual, such as atmosphere, social norms, or 
other contextual factors, influenced their actions (situational attribution; 1 = Strongly disagree, 6 
= Strongly agree). Vignette and question presentation order were counterbalanced. For each 
vignette, a “biased attribution” score was assigned (coded = 1) if participants failed to report both 
dispositional and situational factors as influential to the individuals’ behavior. Otherwise I 
assigned a score of 0. I calculated a composite index of biased attribution by averaging the scores 
from the four vignettes; α = .60. 
Results 
Convergent Validity 
Chapter 2 results are presented in Table 2. I first examined the relationships between wise 
reasoning (interpersonal conflicts) measure and the three self-report measures of wisdom. As 
expected, I observed small-to-medium positive associations with these measures, .19 < rs ≤ .40, 
suggesting good convergent validity. Next, I found that wise reasoning about interpersonal 
conflicts related to wise reasoning about the intergroup conflict, r = .45, p < .001. In turn, wise 
reasoning about the intergroup conflict significantly predicted observer-rated wise reasoning 
performance about the intergroup conflict, B = .19, t(200) = 2.66, p = .008. This association is 
comparable in magnitude to the degree of convergence of self- and observer-ratings on other 





assessments and across situations is noteworthy. It suggests that people’s wise reasoning in one 
situation may generalize to another. 
Discriminant Validity 
Biased responding. Next, I tested whether interpersonal (vs. intergroup) wise reasoning 
and trait level measures of wisdom would predict biased responding. Each of the trait-level 
wisdom measures was associated with biased responding, .22 ≤ rsimpression management ≤ .40 and .17 
≤ rsself-deception ≤ .36 (ps < .001), replicating past findings (Glück et al., 2013; Taylor et al., 2011). 
In contrast, wise reasoning scores were negligibly related to biased responding, rimpression management 
= .08, p = .014, rself-deception = -.05, p = .186, establishing evidence of the new measure’s 
independence from biased responding, and further distinguishing wise reasoning from self-report 
trait-style wisdom measures.  
Social biases. Next, I compared the relations between wise reasoning and the three trait-
style measures of wisdom to measures of social-psychological bias. Here, I found that the trait-
style measures related to greater bias blind spot, .18 ≤ rs ≤ .25, but wise reasoning scores did not 
(r < .01). Furthermore, participants with higher wise reasoning scores were less likely to make 
biased (vs. balanced) attributions, r(696) = -.11, p = .002, as were participants scoring higher on 
one trait-style wisdom scale, the SAWS: r(227) = -.13, p = .040.4 The size of the association 
between wise reasoning and biased attribution was comparable when controlling for SAWS, r = -
.11, p = .07 (note that the magnitude of the relation between wise reasoning and biased 
attributions controlling [vs. not controlling] for SAWS remains the same but the p-value 
increases due to smaller sub-sample containing both SAWS and wise reasoning data). In 
                                                 






contrast, the reverse was not true—the magnitude of the relationship between SAWS and biased 
attributions was reduced when controlling for wise reasoning, r = -.07, p = .25. 
Chapter 2 Summary 
Altogether, Chapter 2 presented findings showing that wise reasoning scores exhibited 
good convergent validity, with consistent relations with extant trait-style wisdom scores and 
observer-rated wisdom scores, as well as expected relations to wise reasoning about intergroup 
conflict. Further, Chapter 2 findings showed that, in contrast to trait-style wisdom measures, 
wise reasoning exhibited excellent discriminant validity, and was independent of biased 





CHAPTER 3: INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL OUTCOMES 
According to psychological theorizing on wisdom (Baltes & Smith, 2008; Erikson, 1984; 
Ryff & Heincke, 1983; Ryff & Keyes, 1995; Staudinger & Glück, 2011; Sternberg, 1998), the 
wise individual ought to be balanced in thinking, judgment, and action, skilled at emotion 
regulation and intelligence, and oriented to collective well-being (vs. being predominantly self-
serving). Does wise reasoning relate to such tendencies? Chapter 3 presents the results of tests 
addressing this question. I hypothesized that wise reasoning would be positively associated with 
such tendencies (Baltes & Staudinger, 2000; Kunzmann & Baltes, 2003; Tiberius, 2008), without 
fully overlapping with them (Staudinger & Glück, 2011; Staudinger et al., 1997).  
I selected such measures as mindfulness, openness, emotional intelligence, and 
attributional complexity to compare with wise reasoning, because they have been shown to lead 
to positive social-cognitive outcomes (Fletcher, Danilovics, Fernandez, Peterson, & Reeder, 
1986; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002; Kabat-Zinn, 2000; Law, Wong, & Song, 2004; Wong & 
Law, 2002) that are associated with wisdom (Baltes & Smith, 2008; Dambrun & Ricard, 2011; 
Garland, Farb, Goldin, & Fredrickson, 2015; Grossmann et al., 2013; Staudinger & Glück, 2011; 
Sternberg, 1998). Most psychological perspectives suggest that wisdom involves recognition of 
change and uncertainties in life (Baltes & Smith, 2008b; Basseches, 1984; Grossmann et al., 
2010; Staudinger & Glück, 2011). Hence I expected wise reasoning would be associated with 
changeable (i.e., incremental) beliefs about conflicts and social life in general. Measures such as 
emotion suppression and rumination were selected because of research indicating that they lead 
to negative outcomes (Gross & John, 2003; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). I 
expected negative or null relationships between these constructs and wise reasoning. Finally, I 





agreeableness, and attending to others’ emotions, to examine whether wise reasoning relates to 




Participants in Samples A, B, D, and G completed individual differences measures. 
Participants from Samples A, B, and D were recruited from MTurk to take part in an online 
survey, and were compensated US$.50 for their time. Participants from Sample G were recruited 
as part of mass testing at the University of Waterloo and were compensated with course credit. 
Participants responded to the wise reasoning measure and a subset of the included measures, as 
detailed in Table 3. Participants in Sample G also completed several other measures as part of 
mass testing; these were not analyzed and are not included in the current study. 
Measures  
Attributional complexity. Fletcher and colleagues’ (1986) measure of attributional 
complexity was used. The measure assesses the degree to which individuals are motivated to 
uncover more or less in-depth information about social events. Participants were asked to rate the 
extent to which they agreed with 28 statements (e.g., “I think very little about the different ways 
that people influence one another”) on 7-point scales (1 = Disagree strongly, 7 = Agree 
strongly); α = .92.  
Big five personality traits. John, Naumann, and Soto’s (2008) Big Five Inventory was 
used to assess personality. Participants indicated the extent to which they agreed with 44 
statements about themselves, assessing openness to experience (e.g., “Is curious about many 





assertive personality”), Agreeableness (e.g., “Is helpful and unselfish with others”), and 
Neuroticism (e.g., “Can be moody”) on 5-point scales (1 = Disagree strongly, 5 = Agree 
strongly); αs > .82. 
Communal relationship orientation. Clark, Ouellette, Powell, and Milberg’s (1987) 
scale was used. Participants responded as to how characteristic of them each of 10 statements is 
(e.g., “I’m not especially sensitive to other people’s feelings”), on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 
= Extremely characteristic of me, 5 = Extremely uncharacteristic of me); α = .88.  
Emotion regulation. Gross and John’s (2003) 10-item Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire was used. The measure assesses two dimensions of emotional regulation. The first 
dimension, reappraisal, includes six statements assessing the extent to which individuals control 
their emotions by changing the way they think about situations (e.g., “When I want to feel more 
positive emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the situation”). The second dimension, 
suppression, includes four statements assessing how individuals withhold expressing their 
emotions (e.g., “I control my emotions by not expressing them”). All statements were assessed 
on 7-point scales (1 = Strongly agree, 7 = Strongly disagree); αs > .85.  
Emotional intelligence. Wong and Law’s (2002) 16-item Emotional Intelligence Scale 
was used. The measure assesses 4 dimensions of emotional intelligence: self-emotions appraisal 
(e.g., “I really understand what I feel”), others-emotions appraisal (e.g., “I have good 
understanding of the emotions of people around me”), use of emotion (e.g., “I would always 
encourage myself to try my best”), and regulation of emotion (e.g., “I can always calm down 
quickly when I am very angry”). All statements were assessed on 7-point scales (1 = Totally 





Growth mindset about social relations. I adapted items from the growth (i.e., 
incremental) versus fixed (i.e., entity) mindset of people (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997) to create 
items that measured growth mindset of social relations. I asked participants the extent to which 
they agreed with three statements regarding interpersonal relations (e.g., “People can always 
change their own interpersonal ability”). I also asked participants to report the extent to which 
they agreed with three statement regarding social conflicts (e.g., “The degree of conflict between 
people can change over time”). Participants replied to statements on 7-point scales (1 = Strongly 
disagree, 7 = Strongly agree). Scores were calculated by averaging the items; αs > .79. 
Intellect. Mussel’s (2013) 24-item scale was used. The measure assesses two 
motivational components of intellect: seek and conquer. The seek dimension includes 12 items 
referring to openness and positivity toward situations that are intellectually challenging (e.g., “I 
would like to learn new ways of doing things”). The conquer dimension includes 12 items 
assessing how one is motivated to resolve situational incongruities and master intellectual 
challenges, once they arise (e.g., “I am able to think about things in a lengthy, focused way”). All 
statements were assessed on 7-point scales (1 = Strongly agree, 7 = Strongly disagree): αs > .95.  
Mindfulness. Baer and colleagues’ (2006) 39-item Five Factor Mindfulness 
Questionnaire was used. The measure assesses non-reactivity to inner experience (e.g., “In 
difficult situations, I can pause without immediately reacting”), observing/attending (e.g., “I pay 
attention to how my emotions affect my thoughts and behavior”), acting with awareness (e.g., “I 
find myself doing things without paying attention”), describing/labeling with words (e.g., “I’m 
good at finding the words to describe my feelings”), and non-judging of experience (e.g., “I 





statements on 5-point scales (1 = Never or very rarely true, 5 = Very often or always true): αs > 
.85.  
Perspective taking. The perspective taking dimension of Davis’ (1980) Empathy 
Questionnaire was used. Participants rated the degree to which nine statements describe them 
(e.g., “I try to look at everybody’s side of an agreement before I make a decision”) on a 5-point 
scale (1 = Does not describe me well, 5 = Describes me very well): α = .80.  
Rumination. Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow’s (1991) 10-item Ruminative Responses 
Scale was used. The measure assesses two dimensions of rumination: adaptive reflection (e.g., 
“Go someplace alone to think about your feelings”) and maladaptive brooding (e.g., “Think: 
What am I doing to deserve this?”). Each dimension was assessed with 5 items on 4-point scales 
(1 = Almost never to 4 = Almost always); αs > .77.  
Results 
Sample inclusion, number of observations and items per measure, central tendency for 
each measure, and correlations between wise reasoning and individual differences measures are 
presented in Tables 3-4. Wise reasoning was significantly associated with open-minded beliefs 
and thinking styles, including growth mindset about social relations, intellect, attributional 
complexity, and openness. Wise reasoning was further associated with greater social orientation, 
as measured by perspective-taking, extraversion, communal relationship orientation, and others-
emotions appraisal sub-scale of emotional intelligence. Finally, wise reasoning was related to 
emotion regulation, three sub-dimensions of mindfulness (non-reactivity, observing and 
attending, describing with words), emotional intelligence (self-emotions appraisal, use of 
emotions, regulation of emotions), emotional reappraisal, and adaptive reflection. Although 





variance with adaptive reflection (Treynor et al., 2003). When controlling for reflection, 
brooding was unrelated to wise reasoning, r = .06. In contrast, reflection remained positively 
associated with wise reasoning when controlling for brooding, r = .23. Associations with other 
individual differences did not reach statistical significance.5  
Chapter 3 Summary 
Taken together, Chapter 3 findings showed that wise reasoning relates to positive 
individual-level outcomes. Wise reasoning scores were positively related to mindfulness and 
other beneficial cognitive traits, adaptive emotional functioning, and orientation to collective 
well-being. The findings indicate that wise reasoning has excellent construct validity (Cronbach 
& Meehl, 1955), and that people’s use of wise reasoning in their own interpersonal and 
workplace conflicts relates to, but is not fully explained by, individual differences in these other 
contructs (i.e., no observed relation was greater than .50).  
  
                                                 
5 Much research has investigated perspective taking alone, and its positive relations to important 
psychological and social outcomes (e.g., prosociality; Underwood & Moore, 1982). I explored 
whether wise reasoning would relate to individual differences in emotion regulation, and 
prosocial tendencies once the variance explained by the perspective-taking aspect of wise 
reasoning was removed. To this end, I first computed a perspective-taking index, using the first 
four items of the wise reasoning scale. I also recalculated an overall index of wise reasoning by 
averaging the remaining 17 items. Next, I conducted five separate regression analyses with 
perspective-taking index as the predictor of wise reasoning (average index and four sub-
components), saving the unstandardized residual scores for further analyses. This process 
removed the variance explained by the perspective-taking index from the remaining wise 
reasoning scores. Finally, I tested the zero-order correlations between the residual scores and 
each of the individual differences in the current study. Results are presented in Table 4, 
alongside the correlations between the non-residualized scores and individual differences, for 
comparison. As results indicate, the pattern of results was similar, albeit with different magnitude 





CHAPTER 4: INTERPERSONAL-LEVEL OUTCOMES 
Chapter 3 showed initial evidence of the relation between wise reasoning and balancing 
self-interest with others’ well-being—prosociality in terms of trait-level communality and 
agreeableness—an important assumption of the concept of wisdom (Staudinger & Glück, 2011; 
Sternberg, 1998). However, I wanted to establish stronger and more nuanced evidence for this 
relation and how it manifests in behavior in different domains. Thus, in Chapter 4, I present two 
studies testing the relationship between wise reasoning and prosociality, in two domains: 1) in 
behaviors within participants’ own interpersonal conflicts (Study 4) and 2) in a public goods 
game (PGG; Study 5). As described more below, Study 5 presents a more nuanced examination 
of the effect of wise reasoning on prosociality by testing whether wise reasoning moderates the 
previously-demonstrated (Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012) negative effect of decision time on 
cooperation. 
Study 4 
In Study 4, I test the relations between wise reasoning and the behaviors that people 
report engaging within the same conflict they recalled for the wise reasoning assessment. In this 
test, I expected that wise reasoning would relate to more prosocial and less antisocial conflict-
related behaviors, within participants’ own interpersonal conflicts. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
Participants were drawn from Samples B-D, and F. In all cases, participants were 
recruited from MTurk to take part in an online survey, and were compensated US$.50 for their 
time. Participants from Samples B-D were assessed for their wise reasoning about an intergroup 





participants reported the conflict-related behaviors that they engaged within that same conflict 
(e.g., forgave the other person). Participants from Sample F completed the same measures as 
above, but reported their conflict-related behaviors first (to ensure that the wise reasoning 
measure itself did not influence responses to conflict-related behaviors).  
Measures 
Conflict-related behaviors. Based on research on conflict resolution (De Dreu, Evers, 
Beersma, KluIr, & Nauta, 2001; Deutsch et al., 2011; Rahim & Magner, 1995) I created items 
assessing the behaviors that participants engaged, specifically within the conflict they recalled as 
part of the wise reasoning measure. Participants responded to statements concerning their 
behavior during the conflict: 1) I tried to find another person to hear both sides of the story; 2) I 
tried to find somebody to give me impartial advice; 3) I tried to communicate with the other 
person to try to solve the problem together; 4) I forgave the other person; 5) Tried to just 
disengage from the other person and/or the situation; 6) Retaliated against the other person; 7) 
Tried to find an ally against the other person. Participants indicated whether they engaged in 
each behavior (No/Yes). Items 1-4 were categorized as prosocial, and items 5-7 as anti-social. 
Results 
Concerning the relationship between wise reasoning and prosocial conflict-related 
behavior, I found that greater wise reasoning related to people’s prosocial behaviors within their 
own conflicts, .08 < ρs < .22 (ps < .001), and less likelihood of engaging in anti-social behaviors, 
-.14 < ρs < -.11 (ps < .001). This tendency held controlling for age, gender, and presentation 







Going beyond zero-order relations, Study 5 presents the results of a more nuanced 
examination of the effect of wise reasoning on prosociality. Specifically, I wanted to examine 
whether wise reasoning relates to more robust prosociality. Would wise reasoners maintain 
cooperation in situations that typically evoke self-interested concerns? For this test, I examined 
recent research on the cognitive underpinnings of cooperation, which has shown that decision 
time can reduce cooperation (Rand et al., 2012). Rand et al. (2012) suggested that deliberation 
(time) reduces cooperation because it brings forth egocentric concerns in response to the threat of 
the self being exploited in economic games. However, this research neglected to test whether 
differences in thinking style can moderate the effect of deliberation. I suggested that people who 
utilize wise reasoning in their own threatening situations (i.e., conflicts) may be less susceptible 
to the negative effect of deliberation in social dilemma tasks. That is, wise reasoners may focus 
less on the potential self-losses that can be accrued via defection and be more likely to consider 
maximizing potential group gains accrued via cooperation. Accordingly, I tested whether wise 
reasoning would moderate the established negative effect of decision time on cooperation in the 
PGG. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
Participants were drawn from Sample G. Participants were recruited from MTurk to take 
part in an online survey, and were compensated US$.75 for their time. Further, they were 
provided a bonus of US$.40 to use to take part in the PGG. Participants completed the wise 
reasoning measure and the PGG, counterbalanced in presentation order with a standard filler task 





naturalistic decision time on the PGG and also conducted an experimental manipulation of 
decision time. I randomly assigned participants to one of three conditions wherein they were 
forced to deliberate (‘Time-delay’ condition; n = 200) or forced to not deliberate (‘Time-
pressure’ condition; n = 169) on their cooperation decision, or a control condition in which there 
was no time restriction (control condition; n = 2656). I measured decision time in all cases.  
Measures 
Public goods game. Participants took part in a public goods game (PGG). As in prior 
work (Rand et al., 2012), participants were told that they received a $0.40 bonus that they could 
use in a 4-player group task. They then read the PGG instructions (full materials are presented in 
Appendix F), indicating that they were randomly paired with three other anonymous participants 
for a group project and that each member of the group could contribute as much of their bonus as 
they wish to the project. Each member could keep the amount of money that they did not 
contribute. The collective contribution would be doubled and split evenly between all four 
members of the group. After reading the PGG instructions, participants proceeded to a 
contribution page where they were asked to decide how much of their bonus to contribute. 
Following Rand et al., (2012), participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. 
Participants in the ‘time delay’ condition were instructed to consider their decision for at least 10 
seconds; participants in the ‘time pressure’ condition were instructed to take less than 10 seconds 
to make their decision; participants in the ‘control’ condition did not receive time instructions 
(see Appendix F for complete instructions and filtering criteria for participants who failed to read 
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or adhere to task instructions). I tracked the amount of time participants took deliberating on 
their decision in all conditions. 
Results 
To reiterate, I hypothesized that wise reasoning would moderate the established negative 
effect of decision time (naturalistic and experimentally induced) on cooperation in the PGG. 
First, I tested whether wise reasoning moderated the effect of naturalistic decision time (i.e., in 
the control condition) on cooperation. I found no correlation between wise reasoning and 
deliberation time, τ = .05, p = .228. Consistent with prior work (Rand et al., 2012), I found that 
decision time on the PGG decision was negatively related to cooperation, B = -1.47, SE = 0.32, t 
= 4.57, p < .001. However, as predicted, I also found that wise reasoning moderated the effect, B 
= 0.83, SE = 0.32, t = 2.57, p = .011. Unpacking the interaction, I found that the negative effect 
of decision time was attenuated for participants with stronger wise reasoning (+1 SD), B = -0.86, 
SE = 0.25, t = -3.39, p = .001, compared to those with weaker wise reasoning (-1 SD), B = -2.06, 
SE = 0.50 t = -4.16, p < .001. Unpacking the interaction a different way, with decision time as 
the moderator, I found that wise reasoning predicted greater cooperation when participants 
deliberated a lot (+1 SD on decision time), B = 11.73, SE = 5.10, t = 2.30, p = .022, but not when 
they deliberated little (-1 SD on decision time), B = -8.22, SE = 4.77, t = -1.73, p =.086. The 
moderating effect of wise reasoning held irrespective of the order in which participants 
completed the wise reasoning measure and PGG materials (interaction controlling for 
presentation order, B = 0.85, SE = 0.32, t = 2.62, p = .009).  
Next I examined whether wise reasoning moderated experimentally manipulated decision 
time. Analysis with condition, wise reasoning, and their interaction as predictors of cooperation 





wise reasoning interaction, F(2,628) = 2.79, p = .060. As shown in Figure 2, in the deliberation 
(‘time delay’) condition wise reasoning was significantly associated with more cooperation, B = 
10.87, SE = 3.55, t = 3.06, p = .003. There was no significant wise reasoning  cooperation 
association among participants in the other groups, ‘time pressure’: B = 3.69, SE = 4.31, t < 1, p 
> .250; ‘control’: B = -0.33, SE = 3.09, t < 1, p = > .250.  
Decomposing the condition factor into two dummy-coded variables (0 = control, 1 = time 
delay or time pressure), wise reasoning significantly qualified the difference between ‘time 
delay’ and control conditions, dummy-code × wise reasoning interaction: B = 11.20, SE = 4.76, t 
= 2.36, p = .019. However, wise reasoning did not qualify the difference between ‘time pressure’ 
and control conditions, ‘time pressure’-code × wise reasoning interaction, t = 0.77, p > .250. 
Notably, participants in ‘time pressure’ and ‘control’ conditions spent similar amount of time on 
the cooperation task, Mdifference = 2.24, SE = 1.11, p = .130, whereas participants in the ‘time 
delay’ condition spent significantly more time than participants in both other conditions, control: 
Mdifference = 17.25, SE = 1.01, p < .001, and ‘time pressure’: Mdifference = 19.48, SE = 1.18, p < 
.001.  
With no significant difference in time spent on the PGG decision in the ‘time pressure’ 
and control conditions, I pooled the slopes for both conditions, examining whether wise 
reasoning moderated the effect of deliberation on cooperation, finding a group × wise reasoning 
interaction (time pressure + control vs. time delay), B = 9.75, SE = 4.36, t = 2.34, p = .019. 
Instructions to deliberate led to less cooperation among participants with weaker wise reasoning 
(at -1 SD), B = -8.56, SE = 4.46, t = 1.96, p = .051. However, this effect was attenuated and 
reversed in direction among participants with stronger wise reasoning (at +1 SD), B = 6.02, SE = 





Chapter 4 Summary 
Taken together, Chapter 4 findings provided incremental support for my hypothesis that 
wise reasoning would have a positive effect on prosociality. First, stronger use of wise reasoning 
within people’s own conflicts related positively to prosocial and negatively to antisocial conflict-
related behaviors within those same conflicts. Further, I found support for the hypothesis that 
people who are more likely to express wisdom in reflections on personal conflicts tend to sustain 
cooperation in situations that may evoke self-interested concerns. Specifically, I found that wise 
reasoning moderated the effect of naturalistic and experimentally manipulated decision time on 
cooperation in the PGG. The findings indicate that wise reasoning relates to prosociality—
balancing self-interest with interest in others’ well-being—as wisdom theory would suggest. 
They also suggest that the positive effect of wise reasoning is most potent when people are 
explicitly asked to deliberate.  
Notably, although wise reasoning attenuated the negative effect of naturalistic decision 
time in Study 5, the effect was still significant even for those with stronger wise reasoning. One 
explanation for this effect is that I underspecified the focus of the wise reasoning assessment in 
Study 5. Specifically, I assessed participants’ wise reasoning about one of their own conflicts, 
and then tested whether these wise reasoning scores moderated a relationship in a different 
domain: their deliberation and cooperation in the PGG. Although I found some evidence that 
people’s wise reasoning in one domain (e.g., one’s own conflicts) relates positively to their wise 
reasoning in another domain (e.g., intergroup conflicts) in Study 2, I also argue that wise 
reasoning is to some extent situation-specific. As such, wise reasoning could have been a 
stronger moderator of the deliberation-cooperation effect if I had assessed people’s wise 





in Chapter 5, I refined the specificity of my measurement. Specifically, I focused the wise 
reasoning assessment directly on people’s reasoning about a specific conflict, and tested its 
moderating effect on outcomes within the same context.  
Notwithstanding the above caveat, the main purpose of Chapter 5 is to present evidence 
of the benefits of wise reasoning at the group (e.g., societal) level, and to provide more 
conclusive evidence of its bias-reducing effect. Specifically, I tested whether wise reasoning 
about ongoing intergroup conflicts would reduce intergroup bias and improve tolerance and 






CHAPTER 5: GROUP-LEVEL OUTCOMES 
In Chapter 5, I focus on group level benefits of wise reasoning and provide more 
conclusive evidence for the link between wise reasoning and reduced bias. I also test whether 
wise reasoning and reduced bias lead to improved tolerance and motivation. Here, I focus 
specifically on whether wise reasoning reduces intergroup bias: indiscriminate favoritism toward 
ingroups versus outgroups (Fiske, 2002). Intergroup bias has been called “the problem of the 
century” (Fiske, 2002) because of its exacerbating relationship with societal conflict and because 
it is notoriously difficult to reduce, particularly in heightened societal conflicts. Past research and 
practice in reducing intergroup bias focused mainly on intergroup contact interventions. These 
interventions tend to increase favorability of an outgroup because they expose individuals to 
positive experiences with an outgroup member. They provide broader and more balanced 
information that is inconsistent with individuals’ biased representations (e.g., stereotypes, 
prejudices) about outgroups, allowing people to transcend their default, egocentric views (e.g., 
Tadmor, Hong, Chao, Wiruchnipawan, & Wang, 2012). Wise reasoning similarly allows 
individuals to transcend egocentrism and reveals a broader purview of situations and 
perspectives. Further, wisdom is said to relate to balanced (i.e., unbiased) emotions and 
motivation, value-relativism, and tolerance for outside views (e.g., Staudinger & Glück, 2011). 
As such, I suggested that wise reasoning would curb intergroup bias, in terms of more balanced 
impressions and emotional reactions toward outgroups, even without engaging individuals in 
positive intergroup contact. I also explored whether wise reasoning would result in improved 
motivation for contact with outgroup members, an important factor predicting positive intergroup 
contact. Support for this hypothesis would improve understanding about the roots of intergroup 





intergroup bias and maximize the efficiency of extant contact programs. Further, the positive 
effects of contact programs are specific to one outgroup. However, because wise reasoning is a 
general reasoning process, it can be applied to any group and should be applicable across 
different intergroup situations, even during times of heightened conflicts, when providing actual 
positive intergroup contact situations is most difficult. 
As noted in the Chapter 4 summary, I also provide evidence regarding measurement 
specificity for assessing wise reasoning. In the studies presented in Chapter 5, I assessed 
participants’ wise reasoning about a specific intergroup conflict (vs. about any interpersonal or 
work conflict they had experienced). First, I provided an impression formation stimulus to 
facilitate participants’ reflection on the ongoing conflict. I then assessed their favorability to 
different groups in the conflict, as my operationalization of intergroup bias (described further, 
below). Finally, I assessed their wise reasoning about the conflict.   
I hypothesized that stronger use of wise reasoning would relate to reduced intergroup 
bias, which would be observed as more favorable attitudes toward outgroups, and less between-
group polarization in intergroup favorability. I present three studies testing the hypothesis, in the 
context of ongoing, heightened intergroup conflicts (e.g., socio-political and ideological 
conflicts).  
Study 6 
Study 6 established the relationship between wise reasoning and intergroup bias. It was 
conducted in Hong Kong during the Umbrella Movement in 2014, which involved large-scale 
(over 10,000 protesters in a single day) and sustained (2-3 months, depending on territory) 
defiant protests and barricade of major roads in the city. Public opinion about the legitimacy of 






Participants and Procedure 
During the peak of Occupy Central’s Umbrella Movement (UM) protests in late 
November 2014, I recruited 76 local undergraduate students from a Hong Kong University 
subject pool (Sample I). I compared positivity toward UM protestors among protestors (n = 42; 
code = 0) and non-protestors (n = 33; code = 1). Hereby, participants were first asked to form an 
impression of the protestors, based on a picture slideshow (Appendix G). Next, participants 
reported their favorability toward protesters. Finally, I assessed participants’ wise reasoning 
about the conflict (Appendix D). 
Measures 
Impression formation stimulus. Participants viewed a slideshow of 20 headshots of 
Umbrella Movement protesters. Among the 20 headshots, gender of protesters was equal and 
presentation order was randomized. 
Intergroup bias. In Chapter 6, participants reported their favorability toward different 
groups in two ways. Participants from Sample I (i.e., Umbrella Movement conflict) reported the 
extent to which they perceived the protesters as warm (i.e. “warm”, “friendly”, “good-natured”; 
Cronbach’s α = 0.96) and trustworthy (i.e. “trustworthy”, “honest”, and “sincere”) from 1 = not 
at all to 7 = extremely (α = 0.90), two automatic and basic social impressions that influence 
interpersonal and intergroup behaviors (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). In Study 6, reduced 
intergroup bias would be indicated by higher warmth and trust impressions toward protesters by 






Wise reasoning. Participants completed the measure of wise reasoning adapted to focus 
on the specific intergroup conflict (Appendix D); α = .91.  
Results 
I conducted two multiple regressions to test the hypothesis, with group membership 
(protestors vs. non-protestors), wise reasoning, and their interaction as the predictors, and 
warmth and trust impressions as the outcome variables. As expected, there were significant 
Group × wise reasoning interactions, Bwarmth = 1.25, SE = 0.53, t = 2.36, p = .021, Btrust = 1.16, 
SE = 0.40, t = 2.88, p = .005. I unpacked the interactions to investigate if wise reasoning related 
to more favorable impression of outgroup members (Figure 3). Consistent with my hypothesis, 
wise reasoning among non-protesters was associated with more favorability toward protestors, 
Bwarmth = -1.25, SE = 0.33, t = 3.83, p = .001, Btrust = 1.12, SE = 0.25, t = 4.52, p <.001. This 
finding was first evidence that wise reasoning relates to reduced intergroup bias. Unsurprisingly, 
wise reasoning did not relate to more favorability toward protesters for their own group, ps > 
.250.  
Next, I examined how wise reasoning influenced the extent to which group membership 
determined attitude polarization, or favoritism toward the ingroup versus outgroup. For 
participants with weaker wise reasoning (-1 SD), group membership significantly determined 
group-based polarization in favorability toward the protesters. Specifically, non-protestors (vs. 
protestors) with weaker wise reasoning (-1 SD) reported significantly less favorability toward 
protestors, Bwarmth = -1.00, SE = 0.41, t = -2.43, p =.018, Btrust = -0.91, SE = 0.31, t = -2.91, p = 
.005. However, among participants with stronger wise reasoning (+1 SD), group membership did 
not significantly determine favorability towards protestors, Bwarmth = 0.39, SE = 0.41, t = 0.94, p 





wise reasoning is associated with attenuated intergroup bias, with stronger wise reasoning 
improving favorability toward an outgroup and relating to more balanced between-group 
favorability impressions.  
Study 7 
Study 6 was a between-subjects test focused on the effects of wise reasoning on 
individuals’ favorability toward a specific focal group (i.e., Protestors in the Umbrella 
Movement) who played a prominent role in an acute conflict. To extend the findings, Study 7 
was a between- and within-subjects test that examined the balancing effects of wise reasoning on 
intergroup bias for two focal groups with chronic ideological conflict. Importantly, Study 7 also 
investigated whether the reduced intergroup bias associated with wise reasoning predicted 
positive downstream effects in terms of tolerance or support toward social policy that promotes 
equality. I conducted the study in the context of the same-sex marriage conflict in North 
America. At a contentious time prior to the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) 
ruling in favor of same-sex marriage equality, I preselected LGB and Christian heterosexual (i.e., 
Catholic, Protestant, Christian-other) participants to test the hypothesis. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
I preselected 333 undergraduate students, 191 of whom were Christian heterosexuals (i.e., 
Catholic, Protestant, Christian-other), and 142 of whom were LGB (lesbian/gay/bisexual) from 
the University of Waterloo subject pool (Sample J). Group membership variable was coded 0 = 
LGB and 1 = Christian heterosexuals. Approximately 33% of homosexual participants reported 
belonging to a religion (25% Christian, 3.5% Muslim, 3.5% Hindu, 2.1% Buddhist, 1.4% 





not included in main analyses (results were not changed when they were included). Twenty-five 
Christian participants reported belonging to more than one religion. To ensure adequate 
consistency within the Christian group, I report analyses excluding these participants (final n = 
166; results were not changed when they were included). Participants first read a news clipping 
summarizing the debate about same-sex marriage legislation and religious freedom to form an 
impression about the events (Appendix G). Next, they reported their favorability toward the two 
groups as the measure of intergroup bias. Christian heterosexuals then reported the extent of their 
support for same-sex marriage, a policy that would benefit the minority outgroup.7 Then I 
assessed participants’ wise reasoning. 
Measures 
Impression formation stimulus. Participants read a news article detailing the same-sex 
marriage debate that I compiled from the Associated Press. The news article was compiled to 
present neutral information, laying out perspectives from both sides of the debate (Appendix G). 
Intergroup bias. Participants reported their favorability toward Christians and 
homosexuals, rating their general emotions on a feeling thermometer (e.g., Gervais & 
Norenzayan, 2012) from 0 (Extremely Cold/Unfavorable) to 100 (Extremely Warm/Favorable). 
The presentation order of target groups was randomized. In Study 7, reduced intergroup bias 
would be indicated by higher feeling thermometer ratings toward outgroup members, and less 
between-group polarization in thermometer ratings favoring the ingroup. 
                                                 
7 I did not assess support for same-sex marriage in LGB participants because my focus was on 
attitudes toward policy that benefits the outgroup, and was aware of no analogous scale of 
support for Christians, the majority group; further I expected a ceiling effect on support for 





Support for same-sex marriage. To examine attitudes toward policy that promotes 
equality as a downstream consequence, I measured Christian heterosexuals’ support for same-sex 
marriage (Pearl & Galupo, 2007). These participants rated the extent to which they agreed with 
16 statements (e.g., “I oppose the legalization of same-sex marriage”; reverse-coded) on a 6-
point scale (1 = Strongly disagree, to 6 = Strongly agree; αs = .91).  
Wise reasoning. Participants completed the measure of wise reasoning adapted to focus 
on the specific intergroup conflict (Appendix D); α = .94. 
Results 
Intergroup Bias  
Because of the between- and within-subject design, I conducted repeated measures 
ANOVA on participants’ intergroup bias. I entered feeling thermometer ratings toward Christian 
and homosexual targets as the within-subject level factors and group membership as the 
between-subject level predictor, with wise reasoning as the moderator. As expected, I found a 
significant mixed-level 3-way interaction, F(1, 298) = 8.50, p = .004, meaning that participants’ 
favorability toward the different groups depended on both group membership and their use of 
wise reasoning. 
First, I tested whether wise reasoning was associated with more favorability toward the 
outgroup. Findings are presented in Figure 4. Among Christian participants, wise reasoning 
predicted more favorability toward homosexuals (the outgroup), B = 7.54, SE = 3.03, t = 2.49, p 
= .014, but did not significantly predict favorability toward Christians (the ingroup), t < 1, p > 
.250. Among LGB participants, wise reasoning predicted more favorability toward Christians 
(the outgroup), B = 9.29, SE = 3.40, t = 2.73, p = .007, but did not significantly predict 





I then examined how wise reasoning influenced the extent to which group membership 
determined between-group intergroup polarization in favorability. Among participants with weak 
wise reasoning (-1 SD), favorability toward ingroup and outgroup differed substantially, tChristian 
participants = 2.75, p = .007, tLGB participants = 7.84, p < .001. However, among participants with 
stronger wise reasoning (+ 1 SD), such polarization disappeared among Christians, t < 1, p > 
.250, and was much attenuated among LGBs, t = 3.86, p < .001. Providing incremental support 
for my hypothesis, these findings suggest that wise reasoning relates to more favorability toward 
outgroups, for both groups in a conflict. Wise reasoning also has a balancing effect in that it 
attenuated between-group polarization in favorability, for both groups.  
Christian Heterosexuals’ Support for Same-Sex Marriage  
To examine support for same-sex marriage as a downstream consequence, I conducted a 
mediation analysis with 10,000 bootstrap samples (Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & Petty, 2011). 
The analysis included only Christian participants, with wise reasoning as the predictor and 
favorability toward homosexuals as the mediator. Because favorability toward Christians and 
homosexuals were interrelated, favorability toward Christians was controlled for in the mediation 
analyses. Nevertheless, the same pattern of mediation emerged with or without the control. As 
seen in Figure 5, wise reasoning was associated with increased favorability toward homosexuals, 
which in turn was associated with stronger support for same-sex marriage. The bootstrapping 
analysis for mediation revealed that the indirect path from wise reasoning to support for same-
sex marriage was significant, and the direct effect was no longer significant. Thus, the results 
showed that greater favorability toward homosexuals statistically accounted for the variance in 







To this point, all of the findings presented in this dissertation pertaining to the wise 
reasoning construct are correlational. Although the results have been very consistent across 
studies, the correlational design limits claims that wise reasoning causes beneficial outcomes. 
Thus, to extend the findings, in Study 8, I conducted an experimental wise reasoning intervention 
and tested its effect on intergroup bias reduction. The study was conducted in the U.S., the day 
following the SCOTUS ruling in favor of same-sex marriage equality, an event celebrated by 
some Americans, but protested by others. I tested whether the wise reasoning intervention 
reduced U.S. Christians’ and social conservatives’ intergroup bias toward homosexuals. As in 
Study 7, I also tested whether reduced intergroup bias would lead to positive downstream 
consequences, namely tolerance or support for policy that promotes equality, and motivation for 
intergroup contact. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
The day after the SCOTUS same-sex marriage equality ruling, I recruited 378 U.S. 
residents via MTurk to complete an online survey about social issues. Participants were directed 
to one of two surveys. The first survey (intervention condition) contained a wise reasoning 
intervention (detailed below); only Christians and social conservatives were directed to this 
survey. The second survey (control condition) was identical to the first, but without the 
intervention, and did not restrict participation by religion or political orientation (non-Christian 
and social liberals were to be used for a separate study). In total, I collected responses from 201 
American Christians and social conservatives (nintervention condition = 72; ncontrol condition = 129). 





reasoning facilitation task (Appendix H) and were then asked to apply the same kind of 
reasoning to guide their thinking when reading a news article that followed. All participants were 
asked to read and reflect on a news clipping about the same-sex marriage equality ruling 
(Appendix G). Next, they reported their favorability toward Christians and toward homosexuals, 
as well as their support for same-sex marriage equality and their motivation for intergroup 
contact. Finally, I assessed participants’ wise reasoning.  
Measures 
Wise reasoning intervention. Before completing the survey, Intervention (but not 
Control) participants completed a training exercise of recalling a past conflict in their own lives 
(i.e., event-reconstruction, as in the original wise reasoning measure). I then asked participants to 
think about their conflict by using several dimensions of wise reasoning. Questions [aspect of 
wise reasoning] included: How might the other party think or feel about the situation differently? 
[Others’ perspectives] Could the situation change or become clearer in time, or could your 
initial reaction change, when more information becomes available? [Intellectual humility and 
change] Could there be a way to compromise in the situation? [Search for compromise and 
resolution] When you put aside your own feelings, how might the situation appear to uninvolved 
people? [Outsider’s vantage point]. Then, I told participants that they would read a news article, 
and asked them to recall and try to use the same wise reasoning questions while reflecting on the 
article.8 Full intervention materials are presented in Appendix H. These participants then 
completed the same measures as control participants. 
                                                 
8 As expected, participants in the intervention condition took significantly longer to complete the 





Impression formation stimulus. Participants read a news clipping from the New York 
Times that included text about the SCOTUS ruling and depicted photographs of people 
celebrating the event (Appendix G). 
Intergroup bias. Participants reported their favorability toward Christians and 
homosexuals, rating their general emotions on a feeling thermometer (e.g., Gervais & 
Norenzayan, 2012) from 0 (Extremely Cold/Unfavorable) to 100 (Extremely Warm/Favorable). 
The presentation order of target groups was randomized. As in Study 7, reduced intergroup bias 
would be indicated by higher feeling thermometer ratings toward outgroup members, and less 
between-group polarization in thermometer ratings favoring the ingroup. 
Support for same-sex marriage. To examine attitudes toward policy that promotes 
equality as a downstream consequence, I measured participants’ support for same-sex marriage 
(Pearl & Galupo, 2007). They rated the extent to which they agreed with 16 statements (e.g., “I 
oppose the legalization of same-sex marriage”; reverse-coded) on a 6-point scale (1 = Strongly 
disagree, to 6 = Strongly agree; α = .90). 
Motivation for intergroup contact. In the post-SCOTUS study, I included an additional 
item to probe participants’ motivation to engage in intergroup contact as a potential downstream 
consequence (Halperin, Russell, Trzesniewski, Gross, & Dweck, 2011): “If you had the 
opportunity, to what extent would you be willing to meet with people who hold opinions very 
different from yours about same-sex marriage and hear their point of view? (1 = Not at all, to 6 = 
Very Much). 
Wise reasoning. Participants completed the measure of wise reasoning adapted to focus 







Intergroup Bias  
First, I tested whether the intervention increased wise reasoning. Results of an 
independent sample t-test revealed that the intervention was successful, with participants in the 
intervention condition reporting stronger use of wise reasoning (M = 3.80, SD = 0.66) than 
participants in the control condition (M = 3.48, SD = 0.99), t(199) = 2.49, p = .014. I then 
investigated the effect of the intervention on intergroup bias in favorability toward Christians and 
homosexuals. I conducted repeated measures ANOVA, entering favorability toward Christians 
and homosexuals as the within-subjects level outcomes and condition as the between-subjects 
predictor. Findings are presented in Figure 6. Overall, participants reported more favorability 
toward Christians than homosexuals, F(1, 196) = 53.09, p < .001. However, as predicted, this 
main effect was qualified by a significant mixed-level 2-way interaction, F(1, 196) = 13.53, p < 
.001, meaning that participants’ favorability toward the target groups depended on the condition 
to which they had been assigned. 
I first tested if the wise reasoning intervention increased favorability toward the outgroup. 
Participants in the wise reasoning intervention (vs. control) condition reported more favorability 
toward the outgroup, homosexuals, B = 15.34, SE = 4.76, t = 15.34, p = .001, while participants 
in the control (vs. intervention) condition reported more favorability to the ingroup, Christians, B 
= 16.48, SE = 4.05, t = 4.05, p < .001. I then unpacked the interaction to examine the effect of 
condition on polarization in favorability, that is, the extent to which the two conditions exhibited 
ingroup favoritism. Among participants in the control condition, positivity toward ingroup 
Christians and outgroup homosexuals differed substantially, with participants strongly favoring 





intervention condition, such intergroup bias was attenuated, and in fact, reversed, t = -2.24, p = 
.028, η2p = 0.07.  
Motivation for Intergroup Contact  
I conducted a serial mediation with 10,000 bootstrap samples (Model 6; Hayes, 2012) to 
examine motivation for intergroup contact as a downstream consequence of the wise reasoning 
intervention, via improved favorability toward the homosexuals. There was no direct effect of 
the intervention on motivation for group contact (p > .250). As seen in Figure 7, the wise 
reasoning intervention (vs. control) increased participants’ use of wise reasoning, resulting in 
more favorability toward homosexuals and stronger motivation for intergroup contact. The 
bootstrapping analysis for mediation revealed that the indirect path from intervention to 
motivation for intergroup contact was significant and the direct effect was not significant. These 
results showed that stronger wise reasoning and more favorability toward homosexuals 
statistically explained the effect of the wise reasoning intervention on stronger motivation for 
intergroup contact. Switching the order of the mediators and outcome variables yielded 
insignificant indirect effects, providing some support for this particular serial order of the 
indirect effect.  
Support for Same-Sex Marriage  
Using the same method for mediation analysis as the above, I also tested support for 
same-sex marriage as a downstream consequence. There was a direct effect of the intervention 
on support for same-sex marriage (t = 2.660, p = .008). As seen in Figure 7, the wise reasoning 
intervention (vs. control) increased participants’ use of wise reasoning, resulting in more 
favorability toward homosexuals, and stronger support for same-sex marriage. The bootstrapping 





marriage was significant and the direct effect was no longer significant. These results showed 
that stronger wise reasoning and subsequently more favorability toward homosexuals statistically 
explained the effect of the wise reasoning intervention on stronger support for same-sex 
marriage. Again, switching the order of the variables yielded insignificant indirect effects, 
providing support for this specific serial order of mechanism.  
Chapter 5 Summary 
Altogether, Chapter 5 provides strong evidence for the benefits of wise reasoning. 
Specifically, I found that wise reasoning about societal conflicts was reliably associated with 
reduced intergroup bias: more favorability toward outgroups and decreased between-group 
polarization in favorability (e.g., ingroup favoritism). Thus, in Studies 6-8, wise reasoning 
related to more balanced emotional reactions to outgroups. Study 7 also showed that individual 
differences in wise reasoning relates to greater favorability toward policy that promotes equality 
and greater tolerance for others. Chapter 8 provided initial evidence for the causal role that wise 
reasoning plays in reducing bias. The new experimental wise reasoning intervention increased 
favorability toward the outgroup via increased wise reasoning. The intervention also led to 
positive downstream consequences. Participants’ motivation toward intergroup contact and their 
favorability toward policy that promotes equality were increased. Additionally, I found that the 
positive effect of the wise reasoning on these downstream consequences was mediated by 
increased favorability toward outgroups. Thus, the wise reasoning intervention achieved major 







Wisdom is universally valued, yet there are gaps in the empirical research on the topic, 
specifically on its practice and development. I suggest that one of the reasons for the lack of 
large-scale study on wisdom is the absence of a valid and efficient measure that can be adapted 
to assess wisdom in different life challenges. For example, extant self-report wisdom measures 
are confounded by socially desirable responding and focus on global character traits, glossing 
over how people think through life challenges. Performance measures require daunting 
administrative protocol, which can discourage researchers to embark on wisdom research.  
Although there is a paucity of quantitative information about wisdom, there is millennia-
worth of discussion about how it can be practiced and developed. This large body of 
philosophical and theoretical psychological work points to several forms of reasoning that can 
improve wisdom. This dissertation provided first quantitative evidence for the reliability and 
validity of an efficient new questionnaire-based measure of wise reasoning, and that wise 
reasoning leads to outcomes classically attributed to wisdom. Specifically, through confirmatory 
factor analyses over a large sample, Chapter 1 showed that different theoretical aspects of wise 
reasoning indeed covary reliably and represent an empirically testable, unitary construct. Chapter 
2 showed that wise reasoning relates to, but is distinct from, self-reported global-level wisdom 
and other-rated wise reasoning performance. It also showed that wise reasoning is distinct from 
biased responding and social-cognitive biases, outperforming extant wisdom measures. Chapter 
3 showed, as argued by many notable wisdom theorists, that wise reasoning relates consistently 
to individual differences in constructs that relate to positive psychological outcome, such as 
mindfulness, openness, communal orientation, and emotion regulation. Chapter 4 provided 





anonymous contexts and in situations that have previously been shown to evoke egocentric 
imbalance (i.e., social dilemma tasks; when deliberating about social dilemma decisions). 
Chapter 5 provided both correlational and experimental evidence that wise reasoning can balance 
emotional reactions in situations involving highly-polarized societal issues, improving 
motivation for intergroup contact and increasing tolerance for policy that benefits an outgroup. 
Altogether, the findings provide much support for the claim that wise reasoning provides a 
psychological foundation for wisdom. The findings showed i) that it can be reliably and validly 
assessed, ii) that it can be—and is—practiced by people within their own life challenges, iii) that 
it relates positively to a range of individual, interpersonal, and intergroup outcomes, and iv) that 
it can be facilitated, suggesting that it can be practiced and developed.  
The new wise reasoning measure focuses on specific thinking processes within or about 
concrete life challenges. By focusing on concrete challenges, the new measure exploits the 
context-specificity necessary to understand the application of wise reasoning to the varied and 
complex challenges facing contemporary society. In this dissertation, I was able to conduct 
assessments on three similar areas—workplace, interpersonal, and intergroup conflicts—but the 
measure’s flexibility invites inquiry to a very broad range of situations. The new measure moves 
beyond extant wisdom measures by assessing practicable psychological processes, as compared 
to the indirect evidence of those processes gained via assessments of wise character (as in global, 
trait-level measures) and the contents of individuals’ reasoning (as in performance measures). As 
such, this dissertation provides first large-scale assessment of wise reasoning, shows evidence of 
its psychological benefits, and provides methods for research focused on the practice and 





In addition to assessing naturalistic wise reasoning, this dissertation also introduced a 
new experimental wise reasoning intervention. The results from the intervention (Study 8) 
showed convergent evidence for the utility of wise reasoning by showing nearly identical results 
as naturalistic, individual differences in wise reasoning (Studies 6 and 7). Study 8 findings 
provided causal evidence, namely that wise reasoning reduced intergroup bias. The intervention 
materials provide a simple method for reducing bias in intergroup conflicts—the main purpose of 
intergroup contact interventions—that does not require actual contact experience with an 
outgroup member, a daunting process for intergroup researchers to administer. The intervention 
increased participants’ motivation to interact with and tolerance in the form of support for policy 
meant to benefit outgroup members. Last, and perhaps most important for the downstream goals 
of my research, the success of the intervention suggests that people can practice wise reasoning, 
that such practice results in immediate benefits. Potentially, wise reasoning can be developed 
through such practice.  
Implications and Future Directions 
The studies presented in this dissertation have important implications for theory and 
research on wisdom. Theorists over millennia have claimed that wisdom would relate to many 
personal and social benefits. Here, I focused on reasoning components of wisdom. I expected 
that wise reasoning should relate to an improved ability to manage emotional reactions, for 
example to moderate the level to which emotions dictate judgment and decision making, and 
thereby also improve motivation, for example to be less self-centered and more tolerant of 
different views or values. The current studies showed that wise reasoning relates to reduced 
cognitive bias, balancing self-interest with group goals, more moderate emotional reactions and 





wisdom. Studies 7 and 8 showed at both the correlational and experimental levels that using wise 
reasoning can afford moderation in emotion (i.e., reducing intergroup bias), and that doing so 
also balances individuals’ motivation (i.e., increasing tolerance for different views and values, 
and increasing motivation for intergroup contact). 
This dissertation also provides new confirming evidence regarding the importance of ego-
detachment/self-transcendence, intellectual humility, taking multiple and broader perspectives 
and attempting to integrate them, for beneficial psycho-social outcomes. These elements of 
cognition have been argued to help individuals lead better, wiser lives by many theorists over the 
ages (e.g., Baltes & Smith, 2008; Frankl, 1966; Rahula, 1974; Staudinger & Glück, 2011; 
Vervaeke & Ferraro, 2013; Weststrate et al., 2016). However, no research has provided a 
comprehensive and large-scale test on these ideas, assessing these forms of reasoning as a 
unitary construct. This dissertation is the first set of studies showing evidence that different 
aspects of wise reasoning work together to relate to a host of adaptive individual difference 
variables, interpersonal cooperation, motivation, emotional balance, and even existential 
tolerance in the form of support for social policy meant to benefit outgroup members and 
motivation for contact with outgroup members. By exploring and confirming these relations 
empirically, this dissertation represents an important advance in the theory and philosophy of 
wisdom. 
The new measure, training paradigm, and results presented in this dissertation open up 
numerous avenues for future research. The current dissertation provides first examples that wise 
reasoning can be core to the benefits of wisdom at individual, interpersonal, and intergroup 
levels, and provides a measure that can allow researchers to conduct research on the practice and 





and the new psychometric and experimental materials presented here to guide studies on the 
practice and development of wisdom. This could include, for example, diary studies testing the 
relations between situation-specific wise reasoning and decision making and behavior, and 
longitudinal studies conducting similar tests over major life challenges and through time. 
Regarding the new measure, and specifically its adaptability to different situations and 
contexts, future research should investigate its utility for assessing wise reasoning in other 
challenging situations within educational, organizational, and business, leadership, and 
negotiation contexts. It also allows researchers to conduct efficient tests on the intra-individual 
variability of wise reasoning, across different situations and points in time, which would provide 
crucial information about the trait-like properties of wise reasoning (see Grossmann, 2017). 
Further, in this dissertation, each version of the new measure used very similar items across all 
studies, only adjusting them slightly per type of conflict. Future research should use the new 
situation-specific assessment method to explicitly assess other theoretical components of 
wisdom, including emotional and motivational components (i.e., with novel items), to examine 
their benefits and whether and how they converge with aspects of wise reasoning examined here.  
Regarding the wise reasoning construct, this dissertation opens the path for researchers 
and practitioners in many fields to investigate when and how wise reasoning can result in 
positive outcomes. That is, many of the problems under investigation in different streams of 
psychology, from clinical to organizational, from strategic management and negotiation to 
behavioral economics, all involve some focus of imbalance: egocentrism, bias, misperception, 
misattribution, lack of trust/cooperation, and motivated cognition. This dissertation showed that 
wise reasoning can be beneficial across a range of situations and levels of analysis. As such, I 





streams of social science should consider the utility of wise reasoning. With the availability of 
the new measure, such investigations are now viable and can be easily administrated with little 
investment and potential for great profit, and with simple methods for improvement. For 
example, wise reasoning can provide a parsimonious explanation for resolving problems that 
tend to involve imbalance, egocentrism, or bias, and the new wise reasoning intervention 
paradigm can be used and adapted to train individuals to use wise reasoning within or about a 
broad array of challenges.  
One of my goals in conducting this research was to understand how wisdom can be of use 
in applied contexts, such as in organizational behavior and leadership. This research opens up 
new directions for research in these areas. For example, many studies have shown that 
employees who experience challenges in the workplace, such as low levels of fairness, tend to 
perform worse and engage more in deviance (e.g., Colquitt et al., 2013). However, little research 
has examined the reasoning processes that determine these relations, and no research has 
investigated the role of wisdom in determining the effects of workplace challenges. I suggest that 
wise reasoning provides employees with a psychological buffer that can enable them to 
reinterpret and deal more effectively with a broad range of negative workplace challenges, 
thereby reducing the relations between such experiences and negative outcomes such as 
employee deviance. Future research should investigate the role that wise reasoning plays in 
determining employees’ reactions to challenging workplace situations, and whether this leads to 
positive downstream outcomes, such as improved interpersonal relations, work performance, and 
commitment to the organization. 
The present studies have demonstrated that wise reasoning relates to more cooperation 





team effectiveness in the workplace, and could be even more important and tenuous as diversity 
in the workplace increases. As such, future research should examine how wise reasoning affects 
workplace processes that involve groups or teams with high or increasing levels of diversity 
(e.g., multinational teams, interdisciplinary teams). For example, the categorization-elaboration 
model of group diversity and performance (Van Knippenberg, De Dreu, & Homan, 2004) 
suggests that, although all types of diversity can (or ought to) have positive effects on workplace 
performance (e.g., teamwork), imbalanced impressions and emotions toward different groups can 
reduce or even reverse such effects. Specifically, the model suggests that bias distracts people 
from deliberating appropriately about job tasks. My findings showed that wise reasoning reduced 
intergroup bias and improved individuals’ downstream cooperative attitudes toward outgroup 
members. Thus, I suggest that wise reasoning would be an important mechanism determining the 
effects of workplace diversity on individual and team performance. Future research should assess 
whether wise reasoning reduces the negative effects and amplifies the positive effects of 
diversity in the workplace, and whether it plays an adaptive role in team performance in general. 
The findings presented in this dissertation open new directions for the leadership 
research. Leadership scholars and practitioners have begun to assert that, because one role of 
leadership is to effectively navigate, prevent and resolve complex social challenges, the field 
must begin to introduce wisdom concepts into leader decision-making, specifically to understand 
how to develop wise, balanced leaders. For example, McKenna, Rooney, & Boal (2009), arguing 
for such a necessity, put forth a series of “wisdom principles” for leadership. They cited such 
factors as using reason and careful observation, pragmatic decision making that acknowledges 
different values orientations and workers’ needs for pleasant and rewarding workplace 





with the wisdom principles. The current dissertation provides a measure capable of testing 
McKenna et al.’s (2013) propositions, and allows for in-depth analyses of how leaders’ wise 
reasoning relates to the outcomes associated with each style of leadership, an important direction 
for future research.  
The new measure also allows researchers to determine whether and when leaders use 
particular aspects of wise reasoning more than others, and whether the type or context of 
leadership decisions demand particular aspects of wise reasoning more than others. Perhaps most 
importantly, the new measure allows researchers to examine the dynamic nature of leadership—
simultaneously managing individuals, relationships, groups and work processes. Specifically, it 
can be used to determine how and when leaders switch or adapt their wise reasoning to fit 
different situations, and how these processes lead to adaptive outcomes in their decision making. 
The leadership research has recently come under criticism for several validity issues, one of 
which is a focus on outcomes rather than psychological processes to explain leadership (e.g., 
Knippenberg & Sitkin, 2013). This dissertation, and specifically the new wise reasoning 
measure, may find one of its most important roles in providing a new method for investigating 
the psychological processes that lead to effective leadership. They have the potential to improve 
the validity of the leadership research and they provide new concepts by which leadership can be 
defined, assessed, and trained. 
Finally, although discussed earlier, I would like to end this discussion on the notion of the 
practice and development of wisdom. The aim of the current work was to establish a new method 
of assessing and inducing the reasoning processes theorized to promote wisdom, in order to 
facilitate research on the practice and development of wisdom. This is only a starting point—





reasoning creates wiser individuals and, furthermore, wiser societies. On this point, future 
research should examine how wise reasoning is practiced and developed over the lifespan, how 
life experiences can have an impact on wise reasoning, and how wise reasoning leads broadly to 
adaptive life outcomes. The current work begins to pave a way for such research. Much remains 
to be done to further understand the psychology of wise reasoning, and the practice and 
development of wisdom and balance at the individual, interpersonal, and societal levels. 
Conclusion 
Wisdom is a quality that is revered by people from every culture. Many recent calls, from 
both academia and industry, have been made to invigorate discourse on the age-old concept and 
to study its practice and development, to help people better navigate contemporary challenges 
(e.g., education, leadership, conflict management). However, wisdom has not yet enjoyed large-
scale empirical investigation. I suggested that one reason for this gap in the research is that there 
is no efficient measure of wisdom. My doctoral research provides a valid and efficient method to 
assess wise reasoning, and establishes a comprehensive network of relations between wise 
reasoning and concepts that are crucial to individual, social, organizational, and societal well-
being. Going beyond individual differences in wise reasoning, the present work also provides 
experimental evidence for the utility of a wise reasoning intervention for ameliorating bias and 
improving tolerance and motivation toward others. The evidence and materials provided in this 
dissertation have a potential to spark greater interest in research and applied work on wisdom 
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Appendix A: Initial Wise Reasoning Scale Items 
 
Item # Label 
1* Put myself in the other person's shoes 
2 Tried to not waste time thinking about the other person's beliefs - they did something wrong, and that's that 
3 Told myself that the other person was wrong for what they were doing 
4 Wondered whether the other person might be right 
5* Tried to communicate with the other person what we might have in common 
6 Wondered about the possibility that we could both be right and/or wrong 
7* Made an effort to take the other person's perspective 
8 Spent time thinking about why the other person felt the way they did 
9* Took time to get the other person's opinions on the matter before coming to a conclusion 
10 Considered how the situation might change through time 
11 Believed that how the situation would work out was set in stone right from the beginning 
12 Thought about how the other person's intentions and opinions might change as the situation evolves 
13 Wondered whether my own intentions and opinions might change as the situation evolves 
14 Approached the situation assuming there were two sides to the situation 
15* Looked for different solutions as the situation evolved 
16* Considered alternative solutions as the situation evolved 
17 Assumed that there could be multiple ways the situation might unfold 
18 Knew whose side to take as soon as the conflict began 
19 Knew exactly how the situation would end 
20 Did not form judgment until I saw the outcome of the situation 
21* Believed the situation could lead to a number of different outcomes 
22* Thought the situation could unfold in many different ways 
23 Wondered whether the situation seemed to be about one issue, but really was about something else 
24 Search for underlying reasons for the situation 
25* Double-checked whether my opinion on the situation might be incorrect 
26* Double-checked whether the other person's opinions might be correct 
27 Tried to establish whether both parties had common ideas about the situation 
28* Looked for any extraordinary circumstances before forming my opinion 
29* Behaved as if there may be some information to which I did not have access 
30 Tried to understand the context of the situation 
31 Told myself that I was in the right, and not to worry about extra details 
32 "Stuck to my guns" on the matter - I knew who was wrong and who was right 
33* Tried my best to find a way to accommodate both of us 
34 Realized that it was not possible for a single involved party to come out as a sole winner from the situation 
35* Though it may not have been possible, I searched for a solution that could result in both of us being satisfied 
36* Considered first whether a compromise was possible in resolving the situation 
37 Considered a compromise to be a weak solution in this situation 
38 Avoided compromise, since it would make it impossible for me to come out satisfied 
39* Viewed it as very important that we resolve the situation 
40* Tried to anticipate how the conflict might be resolved 
41 Tried to "step outside myself" to gain perspective on the situation 
42 Attempted to view the situation from a 3rd person perspective 
43* Wondered what I would think if I was somebody else watching the situation 
44* Tried to see the conflict from the point of view of an uninvolved person 
45* Asked myself what other people might think or feel if they were watching the conflict 
46* Thought about whether an outside person might have a different opinion from mine about the situation 





Appendix B: Event Reconstruction and Final Wise Reasoning Scale 
Event Reconstruction of Wise Reasoning 
In this section we would like you to think about a difficult situation that has happened to 
you with another person, specifically in your workplace / specifically with a close friend (e.g., 
a disagreement, conflict). This should be a situation that you yourself were involved in, whether 
or not you were the person who initiated the situation. We would like you to take a moment to 
recall the situation and visualize the events in your mind’s eye; consider who was involved and 
what happened, what you thought and how you felt. After doing so, please respond to the 
following questions: 
1. When did this situation first begin? 
i. This week 
ii. Within the last month 
iii. Within the last 6 months 
iv. Within the last year 
v. Over a year ago 








viii. Don’t remember 




iv. Don’t remember 
4. What were you doing when it happened? This only needs to be a sentence or two. 
i. {text box} 
5. Where were you? 
i. {text box} 
6. Who was involved in this situation? Check any/all that apply – you may select more 
than one for any person: a coworker may also be a friend. (This question is omitted 
when assessing conflicts with a close friend) 
i. Boss, supervisor, or manager 
ii. Mentor 
iii. Trainer  
iv. Colleague or Coworker 
v. Subordinate 
vi. Mentee 
vii. Trainee or Apprentice 








7. Was the person the same gender as you? 
i. Yes 
ii. No 
8. As you were thinking about this situation, what thoughts came to your mind? Please 
write your thoughts in the space provided. 






Final Scale of Wise Reasoning 
 
Please continue to think about the situation you called to mind in the previous section and 
recall the extent to which you engaged in the following thoughts and behaviors – what you 
actually did as the situation unfolded. None of the statements listed below are supposed to be 
"good" or "bad". We are simply interested in how people approach difficult situations. Therefore, 
it is very important to us that you answer as accurately as possible - your honesty is appreciated, 
and your replies are, of course, anonymous. 
 
"While this situation was unfolding, I did the following..." (from 1 – not at all, to 5 – very much) 
 
1. Put myself in the other person's shoes 
2. Tried to communicate with the other person what we might have in common 
3. Made an effort to take the other person's perspective 
4. Took time to get the other person's opinions on the matter before coming to a 
conclusion 
5. Looked for different solutions as the situation evolved 
6. Considered alternative solutions as the situation evolved 
7. Believed the situation could lead to a number of different outcomes 
8. Thought the situation could unfold in many different ways 
9. Double-checked whether my opinion on the situation might be incorrect  
10. Double-checked whether the other person's opinions might be correct 
11. Looked for any extraordinary circumstances before forming my opinion 
12. Behaved as if there may be some information to which I did not have access 
13. Tried my best to find a way to accommodate both of us 
14. Though it may not have been possible, I searched for a solution that could result in 
both of us being satisfied 
15. Considered first whether a compromise was possible in resolving the situation 
16. Viewed it as very important that we resolve the situation  
17. Tried to anticipate how the conflict might be resolved 
18. Wondered what I would think if I was somebody else watching the situation 
19. Tried to see the conflict from the point of view of an uninvolved person  
20. Asked myself what other people might think or feel if they were watching the conflict 
21. Thought about whether an outside person might have a different opinion from mine 




Items 1-4: others’ perspectives; items 5-9: consideration of change and multiple ways situation 
may unfold; items 10-13: intellectual humility/recognition of limits of knowledge; items 14-18: 








Appendix C: Crimea Case Scenario (Chapter 2) 
 
Please read the following article carefully. You will later be asked about your opinion on 
this issue. 
  
Ukraine shares history and cultural heritage with many of its different neighbors. People 
in Eastern Ukraine identify with Russia, and many Russians see Ukraine as part of their 
motherland. In contrast, people in Western Ukraine identify with Western Europe. In the last few 
years Ukraine became a battleground for political and economic influence from Russia and the 
West. The country is in an economic recession and suffers a huge deficit: it requires more goods 
from abroad than it produces and sells. Many Ukrainians wish to join with Russia to avoid 
significant economic hardship. Many others wish to cut ties with Russia and seek deals with the 
European Union, where they see opportunities for more jobs. 
  
Last year, pro-Western Ukrainians hoped that a trade agreement with European Union 
would help the economy. However, at the last moment, Ukraine’s President Yanukovych turned 
away a European deal in favor of a $15 billion bailout from Russia. Some say it was a corrupt 
decision made under pressure from the Kremlin. Following this, hundreds of thousands of people 
took the protest to the streets. In the weeks and months that followed, the protests turned into a 
general outcry against governmental corruption and police violence. Eventually, after much 
destruction and violence protesters took control of Kiev’s city center, and parliament voted to 
remove Mr. Yanukovych from office, who in turn fled the country. Some say the protesters have 
been financially backed up by the Western powers, interested in the natural resources of the 
country. 
  
Recently in Crimea, a southern peninsula of Ukraine with a predominantly Russian ethnic 
majority (58%) and a large Russian military presence, an internationally-disputed election took 
place in which the majority voted in favor of independence from Ukraine and to join Russia. 
Some fear that that the events in Crimea are a sign of things to come and that Ukraine will be 






Appendix D: Intergroup Wise Reasoning Measure (Chapter 2 and Chapter 5) 
 
As you reflected on the conflict, to what extent did you engage in the following thoughts 
and behaviors? Note, none of the statements listed below are supposed to be "good" or "bad". 
We are simply interested in how people approach difficult situations. Please select the extent to 
which you engaged in the following thoughts and behaviors: 
 
"While I was contemplating and writing about the previous scenario, I did the following..." (from 
1 – not at all, to 5 – very much) 
 
1. Put myself in both parties’ shoes 
2. Thought about the things both parties might have in common 
3. Made an effort to take both parties’ perspective 
4. Took time to consider both parties’ opinions on the matter before coming to a conclusion 
5. Looked for different solutions to the evolving conflict  
6. Considered alternative solutions as I learned about the conflict 
7. Believed the situation could lead to a number of different outcomes 
8. Thought the situation could unfold in many different ways 
9. Double-checked whether my opinion on the situation might be incorrect 
10. Double-checked whether either party’s opinions might be correct 
11. Looked for any extraordinary circumstances before forming my opinion 
12. Behaved as if there may be some information to which I do not have access 
13. Tried my best to find a way to accommodate both parties’ perspectives 
14. Though it may not have been possible, I searched for solutions that could result in both 
parties being satisfied 
15. Considered first whether a compromise was possible in resolving the situation 
16. Viewed it as very important that the parties resolve the situation 
17. Tried to anticipate how the conflict might be resolved 
18. Wondered what I would think if I were somebody else considering the situation 
19. Tried to see the conflict from the point of view of an uninvolved person 
20. Asked myself what other people might think or feel if they were considering the conflict 







Appendix E: Attribution Vignettes (Chapter 2) 
 
Vignette 1 
Steve Jensen is the president of a large construction company in New York. Last year, local 
government fined the company, as unstable scaffolding caused problems resulting in injuries to 
several people. 
 
Recently, Steve Jensen started a special discount house building program for large families. 
Also, he decided to donate a large sum of money to a local orphanage.  
Vignette 2 
Sara Martin is a top executive of a company “XinK Int.” “XinK Int.” is one of the leading 
pharmaceutical companies in the US. However, the company has experienced a decline in their 
public image which has led to a decline in sales in the last half a year. Recently, the company 
started several activities, which were focused on the stabilization of their leading position in the 
pharmaceutical market.   
 
Not too long ago, “XinK Int.” developed a new drug for treating malaria. Shortly after that 
several African countries experienced an outbreak of malaria. As soon as Sara Martin found out 
about this event, she decided to donate a lot of medicine to the regions in Africa that needed 
assistance. Local mass media showed different reactions to this news.  
Vignette 3 
Since his childhood, David Conner wanted to become a doctor. Now, he is a young surgeon at a 
local hospital in the Baltimore area. During his first year he has had a wonderful track record. 
However, due to a recent argument with the head physician, any little mistake would mean that 
he would be fired.   
 
Last week, a patient died during a surgery performed by David Conner because another doctor 
had given her an incorrect diagnosis. However, David decided to hide this fact and told the 
woman’s the other doctor's incorrect diagnosis—that the weak heart of the patient was the 
reason for her death, and therefore the doctors could not save her. 
Vignette 4 
Emma Peterson is a banker at a large bank in Cincinnati, OH. Several major pension funds are 
heavily invested in the bank. In the last couple of months, the bank lost a large amount of 
money on the stock market. The current financial difficulties of the bank may devalue the 
bank’s shares.  
 
However, Emma Peterson did not reveal the loss to the company’s shareholders in order to 
avoid causing panic. Instead, Emma Peterson reported a sizeable profit at the annual meeting of 
the shareholders, hoping that the annual balance of the company would still be positive in 







Appendix F: Experimental Instructions for Public Goods Game (Chapter 4) 
Experimental conditions 
Screen 1.  
You will now complete a short decision making task. Below is a description and instructions: 
You have been randomly assigned to interact with 3 other people. All of you receive this same set of 
instructions. You cannot participate in this study more than once.  
 
Screen 2. 
In addition to the 75 cents you already receive for this HIT, each person in your group is given 40 cents for 
this interaction.  
  
You each decide how much of your 40 cents to keep for yourself, and how much (if any) to contribute 
to the group’s common project (in increments of 2 units: 0, 2, 4, 6, etc.). Money contributed to the 
common project will be doubled, and then split evenly among the 4 group members.  
  
For every 2 cents contributed to the common project, the group receives 4 cents to split. If everyone 
contributes all of their 40 cents, everyone’s money will double: each of you will earn 80 cents. But if 
everyone else contributes their 40 cents, while you keep your 40 cents, you will earn 100 cents, while the 
others will earn only 60 cents. Thus, if everybody contributes to the project, you all may gain; if nobody 
else contributes, you may personally lose money on contributing.  
 
Screen 3. 
The other people are REAL and will really make a decision – there is no deception in this study.  
 Once you and the other people have chosen how much to contribute, the interaction is over. Neither you 
nor the other people receive any bonus other than what comes out of this interaction. 
 
Screen 4 (time pressure condition). 
Please make your decision as quickly as possible. You must make your decision in less than 10 seconds!  
Please use the slider to choose the amount of money you wish to contribute: 
Your contribution: 0 -------------------slider-----------------40  
 
Screen 4 (time delay condition). 
Please carefully consider your decision. You must wait and think for at least 10 seconds before making 
your decision. 
 Please use the slider to choose the amount of money you wish to contribute: 
Your contribution: 0 -------------------slider-----------------40  
 
Screen 5.  
You MUST answer these two questions correctly to receive your bonus! 
1. What level of contribution earns the highest payoff for the group as a whole?  









You will now complete a short decision making task. Below is a description and instructions: 
You have been randomly assigned to interact with 3 other people. All of you receive this same set of 
instructions. You cannot participate in this study more than once.  
 
Screen 2. 
In addition to the 75 cents you already receive for this HIT, each person in your group is given 40 cents for 
this interaction.  
  
You each decide how much of your 40 cents to keep for yourself, and how much (if any) to contribute to 
the group’s common project (in increments of 2 units: 0, 2, 4, 6, etc.). Money contributed to the common 
project will be doubled, and then split evenly among the 4 group members.  
  
For every 2 cents contributed to the common project, the group receives 4 cents to split. If everyone 
contributes all of their 40 cents, everyone’s money will double: each of you will earn 80 cents. But if 
everyone else contributes their 40 cents, while you keep your 40 cents, you will earn 100 cents, while 
the others will earn only 60 cents. Thus, if everybody contributes to the project, you all may gain; if 
nobody else contributes, you may personally lose money on contributing.  
 
Screen 3. 
The other people are REAL and will really make a decision – there is no deception in this study.  
  
Once you and the other people have chosen how much to contribute, the interaction is over. Neither you 
nor the other people receive any bonus other than what comes out of this interaction. 
 
Screen 4. 
Please use the slider to choose the amount of money you wish to contribute.  
 
Your contribution: 0 -------------------slider-----------------40  
 
Screen 5.  
You MUST answer these two questions correctly to receive your bonus! 
1. What level of contribution earns the highest payoff for the group as a whole?  
2. What level of contribution earns the highest payoff for you personally? 
 
 
Filtering criteria: Consistent with past studies (Rand et al., 2012) and research on reading speed 
and comprehension (Burns et al., 2002; Mayes, Sims, & Koonce, 2001), I filtered cases for 
failure to read or adhere to PGG task instructions. Specifically, I filtered <2s, <14.24s, and <2s 
on screens 1, 2 and 3, respectively in the control condition, and < 2s, <15.77s, and <2s, on 
screens 1, 2, and 3, respectively in the time pressure and time delay conditions), screening out 
8.5%time pressure/8.4%time delay/6.3%control recruits for failing to read task instructions, and 7.4%time 






Appendix G: Impression Formation Stimuli (Chapter 5)  





















Appendix H. Experimental Wise Reasoning Training Materials (Chapter 5) 
Instructions (part one) 
 
In this section, we would like you to think about a difficult situation that has happened 
between you and another person (for instance, a disagreement, conflict, etc.) in the past 
year or two.  
 
This should be a situation that you yourself were involved in, whether or not 
you were the person who initiated the situation. We would like you to take a moment 
to recall the situation and visualize the events in your mind.  
  
First describe the situation, and then elaborate and explain in one or two 
paragraphs based on the guided questions below. 
 
When you are writing, focus on your thoughts and feelings. Don’t worry 
about spelling, grammar, or how well-written it is. 
 




2. Elaborate and answer the below questions (in one or two paragraphs): 
  
 How might the other party think or feel about the situation differently? 
 Could the situation change or become  clearer in time, or could your initial 
reaction change, when more information becomes available? 
 Could there be a way to compromise in the situation? 








Instructions (part two) 
In the following you will be randomly presented with a news article on a current social 
issue.  
When you read the news article, please recall the questions you have 
answered when you were describing your difficult situation (see again below). Try 
to use the same thinking strategies when you are reflecting on the summary: 
 
 How might the other party think or feel about the situation differently? 
 Could the situation change or become clearer in time, or could your initial 
reaction change, when more information becomes available? 
 Could there be a way to compromise in the situation? 






Appendix I. Tables 
Table 1. Sample Characteristics 
 Sample A Sample B Sample C Sample D Sample E Sample F Sample G Sample H Sample I Sample J Sample K 
Context Workplace Workplace Interpersonal Interpersonal 
Interpersonal 
& Intergroup Interpersonal Interpersonal Interpersonal Intergroup Intergroup 
Intergroup & 
Training Intervention 
Recruited N 653 629 398 773 278 340 532 1154 74 308 201 
Valid N 404 469 398 730 240 340 467 634 74 308 201 
Age M (SD) 32.49 (10.33) 32.49 (10.33) 31.73 (10.33) 32.49 (10.33) 29.76 (7.53) 34.24 (12.51) 20.00(3.59) 34.44 (11.06) 19.14 (0.80) 20.73 (4.96) 37.93 (13.46) 
Gender (%♀) 48.30 49.89 57.45 65.88 62.69 55.60 54.81 62.5/37.5 39/35 231/77 113/87/1 
Ethnicity (%) 
Asian-




Chinese 33.1 8.0 
African-




Caucasian 73.76 72.69 78.7 79.23 74.72   79.7 - 55.8 79.6 
Hispanic 4.46 7.10 4.8 4.58 6.03   3.6 - 1.3 4.5 
Other 6.20 4.10 3.6 4.79 3.83   2.8 - 5.2 7.0 
Median 
Income ($)  35,000-50,000 35,001-50,000 25,000- 35,000 41,000-60,000  - 35,001-50,000 - - 40,000-49,000 
Edu (%) 
High school  12.09 14.9 12.03 7.13  - 10.6 - - 10.4 
College  55.63 36.2 52.74 76.04  Undergrads 73.1 Undergrads Undergrads 70.1 
Post-grad  10.70 37.5.0 14.18 17.54  - 16.4 - - 19.4 
Note: Due to administrative error, income and education questions were not included in Sample A and only age and gender were assessed in Samples F and G. Valid N = 





Table 2. Pearson’s Correlation Between Wise Reasoning, Global Measures of Wisdom, and 
Bias-Related Indicators 
Constructs M (SD) WR SAWS 3D-WS ASTI 
Global Self-rated Wisdom      
SAWS 4.58 (0.61) .40***    
3D-WS 3.28 (0.47) .21***    
ASTI  3.67 (0.69) .19**    
Observer-rated Wisdoma 0.07 (1.08) .19**    
Bias-Related Indicators      
Social Desirability      
  Self-Deception  0.12 (0.11) -.05 .17** .36*** .23*** 
  Impression-Management  0.12 (0.11) .08* .22*** .40*** .24*** 
Bias Blindspot 1.42 (1.81) <.01 .25*** .18** .19** 
Biased (vs. Balanced) Attributions -0.57 (0.33) -.11** -.13* -.04 -.02 
Note. WR = wise reasoning. SAWS = Self-assessed wisdom scale. 3D-WS = Three-dimensional 
wisdom scale. ASTI = Adult self-transcendence inventory.  
a Unstandardized estimate from a linear regression with wise reasoning predicting observer-rated 
wisdom are reported. 






Table 3. Chapter 3 Measures, Sample Inclusion, Number of Items per Measure, Central 
Tendency, and Correlations with Wise Reasoning  
Construct Sample (n) Reliability (α) M SD r 
Big-Five Personality      
  Openness B1 (220) .82 3.72 0.64 .19** 
  Conscientiousness B1 (220) .85 3.88 0.69 .02 
  Extraversion B1 (220) .83 3.14 0.91 .23*** 
  Agreeableness B1 (220) .83 3.8 0.70 .12† 
  Neuroticism B1 (220) .85 2.63 0.83 -.10 
Intellect      
  Seek B2 (220) .95 5.39 1.06 .23*** 
  Conquer B2 (217) .96 5.00 1.15 .24*** 
Attributional Complexity B1 (218) .92 4.69 0.87 .22*** 
Perspective taking    A (404) .80 3.41 0.73 .48*** 
Emotional Intelligence      
  Self-emotions appraisal D (702) .90 5.21 1.20 .10** 
  Others-emotions appraisal D (701) .89 5.2 1.10 .21*** 
  Use of emotion D (701) .88 5.22 1.26 .11** 
  Regulation of emotion D (701) .90 4.83 1.38 .12*** 
Mindfulness      
  Nonreactivity B2 (223) .87 3.27 0.75 .19** 
  Observing and attending B2 (223) .87 3.54 0.75 .42*** 
  Acting with awareness B2 (223) .92 3.30 0.88 -.12† 
  Describing with words B2 (221) .85 3.39 0.75 .17** 
  Non-judging of experience B2 (220) .93 3.04 0.96 -.11 
Communal orientation A (404) .88 2.52 0.79 .24*** 
Emotion Regulation      
  Reappraisal B2 (216) .93 4.88 1.22 .23*** 
  Suppression B2 (216) .85 4.29 1.38 .06 
Ruminative Response      
  Reflection D (701) .77 2.59 0.68 .26*** 
  Brooding D (701) .82 2.54 0.77 .14*** 
Social Relations Growth Mindset      
  Interpersonal relations are 
changeable G (466) .79 4.75 1.07 .16*** 
  Social conflicts are changeable G (466) .85 5.28 0.92 .15*** 
Note. Sample B participants responded to one half of the individual differences measures (i.e., 
B1 or B2).  






Table 4. Pearson’s Correlations Between Wise Reasoning (Residual Score), Individual Aspects of Wise Reasoning (Raw Score / 
Residual Score), and Individual Differences 
Constructs 
 Aspect of Wise Reasoning 
WR Res. Perspective Change/Res. Humility/Res. Compromise/Res.  Outsider/Res. 
Big-Five Personality       
   Openness .20** .08  .20**/.17** .15*/.12† .16*/.13† .13†/.10 
   Conscientiousness .11 -.07 .08/.12† .05/.10 .12†/.20** -.13†/-.10 
   Extraversion .21** .14* .21***/.17* .19***/.14* .14*/.07 .22***/.18** 
   Agreeableness .14* .04 .21***/.20** <.01/<.01 .19**/.20** <.01/<.01 
   Neuroticism -.04 -.09 -.10/-.06 -.12†/-.09† -.11/-.07 .05/.10 
Intellect       
   Seek .16* .17** .23***/.17** .13*/.04 .20**/.12† .16*/.10* 
   Conquer .13† .22*** .22***/.14* .16*/.05 .16*/.03 .20**/.12** 
Attributional Complexity .23*** .10 .16*/.12† .21***/.19** .18**/.15* .18**/.15* 
Perspective taking    .30*** .39*** .38***/.20*** .31***/.09† .48***/.30*** .37***/.22*** 
Emotional Intelligence       
   Self-emotions appraisal .06 .07† .12**/.10** .05/<.01 .11**/.09* <.01/<.01 
   Others-emotions appraisal .11** .19*** .13***/.06 .09*/-.01 .23***/.15*** .13***/.07† 
   Use of emotion .12*** .04 .11**/.10** .05/.04 .13***/.13*** .07†/.06 
   Regulation of emotion .06 .11** .09*/.05 .08*/.03 .11**/.06 .07†/.03 
Mindfulness       
   Non-reactivity .09 .17** .16*/.09 .16*/.08 .18**/.09 .07/<.01 
   Observing and attending .21*** .38*** .36***/.21*** .32***/.13* .34***/.12† .27***/.21† 
   Acting with awareness -.04† -.13† -.03/-.04 -.09/-.02 -.04/.06 -.20**/-.16* 
   Describing with words .10 .14* .21***/.18** .11/.04 .11/.04 .08/.02 
   Non-judging of experience -.06 -.10 -.11/-.07 -.07/-.02 .01/.10 -.18**/-.15* 
Communal relationship  .14** .20*** .22***/.13* .18***/-.07 .23***/.14** .14**-.06 
Emotion Regulation       
   Reappraisal .12† .20** .24***/.16* .17*/.07 .21***/.10 .10/.01 
   Suppression -.06 .11 .02/-.04 .11/.06 .02/-.06 -.06/-.13† 
Ruminative Response       
   Reflection .16*** .21*** .15***/.11 .21***/.11** .19***/.08* .22***/.16*** 
   Brooding .13*** .08* .07*/.18*** .12**/.09* .07†/.03 .19***/.17*** 
Social Relations Growth Mindset       
   Interpersonal relations .11* .11* .15*** .19***/.16*** .11*/.06 .03/<.01 
   Social conflicts  .12** .08† .20*** .16***/.14** .11*/.08† <.01/-.03 
Note. WR Res. = wise reasoning (items 5-17) residual score; Res. = residual score for each aspect of wise reasoning. 





Appendix J. Figures 
 
Figure 1. Five-factor model of wise reasoning. Item numbers are taken from the final 21-item 








Figure 2: Effect of wise reasoning (WR) on the relationship between experimentally manipulated 
deliberation and cooperation in the public goods game. Tests of simple slopes on cooperation 
were conducted at +/- 1 standard deviation from the mean on wise reasoning. Stronger wise 
reasoning related to greater cooperation when participants were instructed to deliberate over their 




















Figure 3. Ratings of favorability (warmth and trust impressions) toward Umbrella Movement 
(UM) protesters (Y axis), by both protesters and non-protesters (X axis). Tests of simple slopes 
on ratings of Warmth and Trust were conducted at +/- 1 standard deviation from the mean on 
wise reasoning. Wise reasoning predicted more favorability toward UM protesters in non-
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Figure 4. Feeling thermometer ratings of favorability toward homosexuals (left) and Christians 
(right; Y axis), by both lesbian/gay/bisexual (LGB) and Christian heterosexual (CH) participants. 
Tests of simple slopes on favorability ratings were conducted at +/- 1 standard deviation from the 
mean on wise reasoning. Wise reasoning related to more favorability toward outgroups and 
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Figure 5. Mediation analysis of the effect of wise reasoning on support for same-sex marriage 
via favorability toward homosexuals among Christian heterosexual participants. Coefficients are 
standardized.  







Figure 6. Feeling thermometer ratings of favorability toward Christians (left) and homosexuals 
(right) by U.S. Christian and social conservative participants. Wise reasoning intervention led to 
































Figure 7. Serial mediation analyses (combined for visualization) of the effect of wise reasoning 
intervention on 1) motivation for intergroup contact, and 2) support for same-sex marriage via 
the use of wise reasoning and favorability toward homosexuals among American Christian and 
social conservative participants. Coefficients are standardized. 
*p < 0.050, **p < 0.010, ***p < 0.001. 
 
 
 
